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t Visiting Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School; Professor, University of Tennessee; B.A.,
Cornell; J.D., NYU; L.L.M. Columbia. A preliminary draft of this Article was presented at the American
Society of International Law Annual Meeting, and I am grateful to the participants, especially Robin
Teske and Julie Mertus, for their comments. Thanks also to Fran Ansley for her sharp comments on a
later draft, to Lee Robinson, Brian Finlay, and Verena Meiser for extraordinary research assistance, to
Sonya Fowler for her expert preparation of the manuscript, and to the University of Tennessee College
of Law for its generous support. This Article benefitted enormously from a week-long seminar for
university teachers of humanitarian law sponsored by the Graduate Institute of International Studies in
Geneva, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Hauser Foundation. I am deeply
indebted to Theodor Meron and Antoine Bouvier for organizing it and to the other participants for their
insights and candor. This Article is dedicated to them all.
1. Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter describe the often jerky crossover of scholarly
innovations (or fads) from domestic law to international law. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Symposium on Method in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 301 (1999). While pastiche is
ubiquitous in international scholarship, see, e.g., infra note 125, the use of ginmicky punctuation to
serve double or triple purposes, has been mercifully sparse until now. I set out my purposes in text
accompanying infra notes 20-21, 43-45.
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Martyrs insist in the face of overwhelming force that if there is to be continuing life, it
will not be on the terms of the tyrant's law. Law is the projection of an imagined future
upon reality. Martyrs require that any future they possess will be on the terms of the law
to which they are committed (God's law). And the miracle of the suffering of the martyrs
is their insistence on the law to which they are committed, even in the face of world-
destroying pain. Their triumph-which may well be partly imaginary-is the imagined
triumph of the normative universe-of Torah, Nomos -over the material world of death
and pain.
-Robert Cover, Violence and the Word 2
"You said, 'Love can do anything.'"
-Manni 3
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the American Journal of International Law published a
Symposium on Method in International Law.4 The organizers sought to
"provide a greater grasp of the major theories of international law currently
shared by scholars"5 and to apply these theories to a concrete legal problem
specifically "the question of individual accountability for violations of human
dignity committed in internal conflict."6 The seven methods selected, with
many lawyerly disclaimers and caveats, were legal positivism,7 the New
Haven School,8  international legal process,9  critical legal studies,10
2. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1604-05 (1986) (internal
citations omitted).
3. RuN LOLA RuN (Sony Pictures Classics 1999).
4. Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 291. The topic remains a subject of ongoing interest.
See, e.g., Final Program, ASIL 95th Annual Meeting, The Visible College of International Law, Does
Method Matter? (the author was the token feminist on the panel this year). See also PErER SuBER, THE
CASE OF THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS: NINE NEW OPINIONS 87 (1998). In The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers, published in the Harvard Law Review in 1949, Lon Fuller presented a fictitious legal case
and created five Supreme Court Justices to serve as mouthpieces for the dominant schools of legal
thought at the time. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 616 (1949).
Suber appropriates Fuller's fiction and adds nine new opinions, each reflecting a new school of thought,
thus demonstrating our increasing self-consciousness about proliferating methods, including feminism,
communitarianism and postmodemism.
The substantive focus of the symposium (and this Article)-accountability for violations of
human dignity-is even more timely now than it was then, in view of Serbia's recent surrender of
Milosevic and his trial in The Hague. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, A Time to Judge What Began and Ended
in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2001, § 4, at 5.
5. Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 292.
6. Id. at 295. This was accepted, according to the organizers, "by all our authors (though in
the same sense that the Versailles Treaty was accepted by the Central Powers)." Id.
7. Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (1999).
8. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
316 (1999).
9. Mary Ellen O'Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334 (1999).
10. Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 351
(1999).
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international law and international relations," feminist jurisprudence, 12 and
law and economics.
1 3
The next issue of the Journal, appropriately if predictably, carried letters
from three respected members of the international legal community, pointing
out omissions or diplomatically thanking the co-editors for affirming the
authors' own approaches to international law.14 This Article is like both kinds
of letters (but longer) in that I both regret the omission of postmodern
international law ("PIL")15 and thank the co-editors for exemplifying (and, in
my view, vindicating) it.
It is unlike both kinds of letters, of course, in that it is not addressed to
the co-editors. Rather, it is addressed to an audience which includes those who
do not necessarily share the assumptions of the "international legal
community,"'16 and who may not be fluent in its dialect. Grounded in PIL's
insistence on questioning assumptions and challenging boundaries, finding an
accessible vocabulary takes on a terrible urgency in the context of "violations
of human dignity." Any legal response to such violations must above all be
intelligible to the law's targets and to those who harbor them.' 7 While neither
can be assumed to be familiar with international law, PIL's affinity for the
vernacular makes it more accessible than the often esoteric language of the
11. Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime
Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 361 (1999).
12. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 379
(1999).
13. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law
Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 394 (1999). For the co-editors' succinct description of
each method, see Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 293-94.
14. Henry Richardson noted the unfortunate omission of critical race theory/Lat-crit legal
theory. Henry J. Richardson Ill, Letter to the Editor, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 99 (2000). Ariel W. GonzAlez
and J. Patrick Kelly both congratulated the co-editors and expressed concern about methods that
deviated from a rule-oriented positivist approach. Ariel W. GonzAlez, Letter to the Editor, id. at 100; J.
Patrick Kelly, Letter to the Editor, id. at 101.
15. This acronym fits in nicely with the alphabet soup of UN agencies (WHO, UNIFEM,
UNESCO, ECOSOC, etc.) and multinationals (BP, MCI, CNN, etc.), the wordless "newspeak" in which
we communicate, or not. See text accompanying notes 17-18, infra. It also pleasantly evokes recent drug
company advertisements and the promise of a magi "pill," a pharmaceutical solution for a maladjusted
world. See, e.g., Zoloft (sertraline HCI) ("You know when you can't get over something traumatic from
your past"). Advertisement (depicting enormous black shadow with hands looming over tiny, terrified
white egg-like creature) on file with The Yale Journal of International Law. See also Zoloft Homepage,
available at http://www.zoloft.com (last visited May 3, 2002).
16. It is unclear who, exactly, comprises the "international community," but they have been
accused of terrible things, including "hesitat[ing] ... to act in accordance with the values and principles
proclaimed in [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention and failing] to
prevent or halt the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later Rwanda." Sven Alkalaj, Never Again?, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 357, 358-59 (1999). Philip Trimble tersely dismisses "the mythical international
community." Philip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 811, 816 (1990) ("[W]e have no common, generally accepted world ideology that would give
meaning to the term 'international society."').
17. This is the logic behind the ICRC's educational efforts with respect to customary norms of
armed conflict. See J. Kellenberger, Relevance and Roles of IHI, and of the ICRC, Address at the
ICRC--Graduate Institute Training Seminar on International Humanitarian Law for University Teachers
(Aug. 7, 2001) [hereinafter "Training Seminar"].
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Symposium." The omission of PIL from the symposium was fitting,Symposiu .ting
accordingly, because PIL did not fit.
Its omission was fitting for other reasons as well. First, as I have
explained elsewhere, PIL is the method of choice of the "omitted," the
excluded, because it focuses on those at the margins rather than on those at the
center.19 Second, PIL is necessarily an "afterword" because it comments on
and reacts to the modernity that precedes it.20 Third, related but distinct, PIL
comes "afterwards"; that is, after the end of the modem international
institution-building period which began after World War II and ended with the
end of the Cold War. Fourth, more portentously, PIL is "after words"; i.e., it
recognizes that words themselves are spent, that the modem emphasis on
"mastery/logos" has been displaced by something else.2 '
At the same time, the co-editors' adoption of what Martti Koskenniemi
decries as the "shopping mall approach to 'method,' the assumption that styles
of legal writing are like brands of detergent that can be put on display... to
be picked up by the customer in accordance with his/her idiosyncratic
preferences,"22 is itselfpostmodem, confirming J.M. Balkin's observation that
"the jurisprudence produced during the postmodern era will turn out to display
18. Postmodemism is not generally known for its accessibility. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow,
Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 461 (1997). But its preference for "mass" culture over "high" culture, Roy Boyne & All Rattansi,
The Theory and Politics of Postmodernism, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY 10 (Roy Boyne & Ali
Rattansi eds., 1990), leads it to use the graphic language of the news, see, e.g., infra note 272 ('machete-
wielding Hutus"), rather than international law's genteel (and ambiguous) "violations of human
dignity." See also Wiessner & Willard, supra note 8, at 318 (noting the need for clarification of the term
"human rights abuses").
19. See Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: The Failure and Postmodern Possibilities
of International Law, 33 VAND. J. TRANSN'L L. 503, 567 (2000). This claim is controversial. It has been
argued, for example, that postmodernism is irreconcilable with human rights. See notes 73-74 infra. In
connection with the problem of individual accountability for violations of human dignity, moreover,
many methods would focus on the "omitted," i.e., the victims. These objections are addressed infra in
Section HILA., Who's At Risk?.
20. [P]ostmodemism . . . operates in a field of tension between tradition and innovation,
conservation and renewal... in which the second terms are no longer automatically privileged
over the first; a field of tension which can no longer be grasped in categories such as progress vs.
reaction, left vs. right.... The fact that such dichotomies, which after all are central to the
classical account ofmodemism, have broken down is part of the shift ....
ANDREAS HUYSSEN, AFTER THE GREAT DIVIDE: MODERNISM, MASS CULTURE, POSTMODERNISM 216-17
(1986). PIL's relationship to modernism is one of the ways in which it is distinguishable from the "New
Approaches to International Law" (NAIL), which David Kennedy describes as "a self-conscious effort
to build a collective intellectual project of disciplinary criticism and renewal [which the author calls]
Inew approaches' to suggest a big tent, interested in the widest range of innovative energy without
predetermining where it would lead." David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the
Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335, 489 (2000). PIL is more likely to define itself in terms of its
relationship to modernism; unlike NAIL, it puts "new" in inverted quotes. Another distinction between
NAIL and PIL is in their relationship to "critical theories." See infra Section IV.A., PIL's Inevitability.
But many elements of the NAIL project resonate with postmodemism, such as their shared attention to
the "will to power," their "embrace of the dark side," their skepticism, their resistance to "progress," and
their preference for ambivalence. Kennedy, supra note 20, at 496-97. See also IHAB HASSAN, Toward a
Concept of Postmodernism, in THE POSTMODERN TURN: ESSAYS IN POSTMODERN THEORY AND CULTURE
91(1987).
21. See generally Wiessner & Willard, supra note 8, at 321 n.8 (explaining that policy-
oriented jurisprudence treats deeds as well as words as indicators of law).
22. Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 352.
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elements of postmodernity whether this is consciously desired or not."23 Does
this mean that PIL is merely a "theory," devoid of application to particular
problems, as opposed to a "method"? 24 Not at all, as this Article will show by
applying PIL to the problem posed in the symposium. But first, a story.
2 5
Run Lola Run begins with a phone call in an apartment in Berlin. The
TV is on. The call is from Lola's boyfriend, Manni, who has left a bag of
money on the subway. His drug dealer boss expects Manni to deliver the bag
in twenty minutes. Lola tells Manni to wait for her and promises that she'll
think of something. 27 She runs out of the apartment and we see her running
downstairs as a cartoon on the TV.
She runs through the city, bumps into a pedestrian, exchanges words
with a passing bicyclist, is almost hit by a car, and dashes into the imposing
Deutsche Transfer Bank, where she surprises her V.I.P. father with his
mistress. She breathlessly begs him for help; he replies coldly that he is
leaving her mother and that she is not even his daughter. Lola runs on, but she
is too late. Manni, desperate, has already begun robbing the supermarket next
to the telephone booth where he should have been waiting for her. He sees her
and signals to her for help. She joins him, and is shot dead by the police a few
minutes later.
The scene dissolves in surreal red light, and Lola and Manni are in bed,
chatting and smoking. "Manni, do you love me?" she asks. Dismissing his
assurances, she announces, "I have a decision to make" as the phone rings and
she's off again. This time, however, she gives the pedestrian a wide berth.
After her father refuses her request, she snatches a gun from a nearby security
guard's holster and repeats her demand, holding the gun to her father's head.
She gets the money and completes the gauntlet, arriving at the meeting place
on time. Manni joyfully runs toward her and is run over.
23. J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1966, 1973
(1992). See also id. at 1978 (focusing on the ways in which postmodem culture and technology have
affected law as an institution); infra text accompanying note 102 (arguing that all law is postmodem).
24. See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 292 ('CThis idea of method is thus distinctly
different from abstract theories of international law... !).
25. This interruption illustrates postmodem method, which privileges disjunction over
continuity and storytelling over theory. See HASSAN, supra note 20, at 89; see also infra text
accompanying note 103.
26. RUN LOLA RUN, supra note 3. True to postmodem method, the story is appropriated from
another genre and another medium. As Stephen Feldman observes, transgressing such boundaries is
characteristic of postmodem method. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern
World: A Flying Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REV. 673, 693-97 (2000). For examples of such transgressions
in international law, see, e.g., Stark, Women and Globalization, supra note 19, at 568 (borrowing from
William Butler Yeats, A Prayer for my Daughter); Barbara Stark, What We Talk About When We Talk
About War, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 91 (1996) (borrowing from Raymond Carver, What We Talk About
When We Talk About Love); Barbara Stark, International Human Rights Law, Feminist Jurisprudence,
and Nietzsche's "Eternal Return": Turning the Wheel, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 169 (1996)
(incorporating Adrienne Rich, Turning the Wheel); Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, Economic
Rights and an International Text: "A Miracle for Breakfast, " 33 VA. I. INT'L L. 433 (1993) (referencing
Elizabeth Bishop, A Miracle for Breakfast). True to PIL, the story here is not only appropriated from
another medium, but from another country, culture, and language.
27. This is the best she can offer to Manni, who reminds her, "You said, 'Love can do
anything."' Lola is a "postmodem woman with a male movie hero's mission," according to Crissa-Jean
Chappell, Crissa-Jean Chappell Tracks Run Lola Run, FILM CoMMENT, Sept-Oct. 1999, at 4.
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Again, Lola and Manni are in bed in the red light. "What would you do
if I died?" he asks. "You're not dead yet," she replies, as the telephone rings
again. Lola encounters the same cast of characters, but this time she is lucky
and she makes better choices. After her father refuses to give her money, she
dashes into a casino and quickly wins what she needs. Leaving the phone
booth, Manni performs a random act of kindness,28 returning a phone card to a
blind woman who was in the booth before him. She points to a fleeing figure,
who Manni sees is carrying the very bag of money he left on the subway. The
movie ends with the lovers' happy reunion, both alive and rich.
Lola, obviously, is an international lawyer confronted with a crisis.
29
The ways in which she deals with the people she runs into (or around, or over)
are like the methods presented in the symposium. She must make a series of
choices and react to an unpredictable series of choices made by others. Each
choice becomes part of a story, and whose story it is becomes clear only in
hindsight. Lola's choices affect the outcome, but they do not determine it.
This Article explains why Lola opts for PIL, which allows her to mix
and meld other methods. It does so by appropriating the questions posed by
the symposium, 30 just as postmodernism appropriates the structures of
modernism. First, it explains PIL's assumptions about the "nature" of
international law, using lex lata (the "law as it is") and lexferenda (the "law
as it should be") as examples. 31 Second, it explains how PIL shifts our focus
from the "decision makers"32 in the public eye to those at the periphery, and
how even a nameless pedestrian may shape the law.
33
Finally, this article explains why PIL is both inevitable and inevitably
transient. Like Lola, the international lawyer dealing with "accountability for
violations of human dignity" does not enter the story until something has
28. "Commit random acts of kindness and senseless acts of beauty." Bumper sticker on old
blue Volvo in Kroger parking lot, observed by author (July 16, 2001). Robert Cover cites "one of
Judaism's oldest rabbinic traditions" for the proposition that the normative world of legal meaning is
created through "'strong forces' [such as] Torah, worship and deeds of kindness." Robert M. Cover,
Nomos and Narrative: The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983). These
"strong forces," needed for "world-creating," are posited in opposition to "weak forces," such as those
present in modem liberalism and international law, needed for "world-maintaining." See infra text
accompanying note 210.
29. The critics seem to have missed this point. But see Chappell, supra note 27. Lola's
mission, like so many, begins because someone lost a bag of money. Like so many international
lawyers, moreover, she is driven not by money, but by love. See infra Conclusion. Lola is an
international lawyer, rather than an international human rights lawyer, because, as the symposium and
this Article make clear, human rights law is necessary, but not sufficient, in dealing with "violations of
human dignity." She must be able to draw on humanitarian law, see supra note 17; international law on
the use of force, see infra note 42; including humanitarian intervention, see infra note 94; on
international criminal law, see infra note 188; on jurisdiction, see infra note 191; and on international
organizations, see infra note 79.
30. Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 298 (setting out the questions to be addressed by the
advocates of particular methods).
31. Id. ("How does your approach address the distinction between lex lata and lexferenda? Is
it concerned with only one, both, or neither?").
32. Id. ("Who are the decision makers under your method?").
33. Id. ("How does [your method] factor in the traditional 'sources' of law, i.e., prescriptive
processes?"). See infra notes 177-180 (describing the importance of serendipity and transient players in
the lawmaking process).
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already gone terribly wrong. The international lawyer's chances of success,
34like Lola's, are not very good. Even if she does everything right, she may
fail to achieve her objectives. International law is often irrelevant in such
contexts or is sacrificed to other interests as a matter of political expediency.
Like Lola in the final scenario, the international lawyer sometimes
triumphs. Even if she does, however, her success is transient. At the end of the
movie, Lola and Manni are alive and rich, but their happy ending-a
successful drug deal-is part of other, less happy stories for other people.
PIL questions the possibility of "success" in the context of "accountability for
violations of human dignity." We cannot rewind the tape; we cannot undo
genocide or other atrocities. Is it nevertheless possible to restore order and
meaning, or, in the words of the late Yale Law Professor Robert Cover, to
affirm "the imagined triumph of the normative universe"? 36 Is it possible to
reconnect the victim-and perhaps even the perpetrator-to the larger
community after "world-destroying pain"?
37
In two famous articles, Violence and the Word38 and Nomos and
Narrative,39 Cover shows how violence destroys meaning, isolating the victim
and the perpetrator. It is through the "word"-the law and the narratives that
drive the law4 -that we recreate meaning and possibilities for human
34. As Martha Minow notes:
Thus, I do not think it wise to claim that international and domestic prosecutions for
war crimes and other horrors themselves create an international moral and legal order,
prevent genocides, or forge the political transformation of previously oppressive
regimes. Expansive claims may be tempting in order to convince international and
national audiences to fund and support trial efforts, but exaggerated assertions are
bound to yield critical and even hostile disappointment.
MARThA MiNow, BETWEw VENGEANCE AND FORGwENESS 49 (1998).
35. In TRAFFIC (USA Films 2000), for example, a newly-appointed drug czar learns how
complicated the global drug economy is, and how difficult it may be to separate the good guys
(including police who do not know for whom they are really working) from the bad (including his own
daughter). This film was based on a more nuanced, less star-studded, BBC mini-series, Traffik (BBC
television broadcast, 1989).
36. Cover, supra note 2, at 1604.
37. Id.
38. Cover, supra note 2. On Cover's fame, see Aviam Saifer, Preface, in NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER vi (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1993)
(describing "the tendency, already well underway, for scholars to consider Bob's published work
canonical.. .') (italics in original); Guido Calabresi et al., Tributes to Robert M. Cover, 96 YALE L. J.
1699 (1987). For a partial list of the additional journals that have published tribute volumes to Cover,
see Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, UTAH
L. REV. 465, 466 n.2 (1998). I first learned of Cover's work when, as a new law teacher ten years ago, a
senior colleague told me "not to miss" the Cover Workshop at the Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Teachers. There I saw the authors whose books fill my shelves, sitting in metal folding
chairs arranged in a huge circle. For law students, the Society of American Law Teachers sponsors an
annual Cover Retreat. See, e.g., Corey Norton, Robert M Cover Public Interest Law Retreat Explores
Progressive Collaboration, SALT EQUALIZER, June 2001, at 4.
39. Cover, supra note 28.
40. 'No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning .... Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live." Cover, supra note
28, at 4-5. The works of legal scholarship focused on or exemplifying storytelling no longer fit in a
symposium, let alone in a footnote. For an earnest effort, see Levine, supra note 38, at 467 n.8 (noting
that "Nomos and Narrative is consistently one of the oldest works cited, and is often acknowledged,
explicitly or implicitly, as one of the seminal works in this area of legal scholarship"). See Daniel A.
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connection, thus "project[ing] ... an imagined future upon reality.' 41 But law
itself is violent, Cover insists. That is, law must be grounded in political
power willing and able to impose law through force.42
The task of Cover's martyr, to "insist in the face of overwhelming force
that if there is to be continuing life, it will not be on the terms of the tyrant's
law,' 43 is precisely the task addressed here. Cover's linkage of violence and
the law, similarly, is precisely the linkage sought by international lawyers in
this context, who often find themselves with plenty of words and enough law
to fill multiple symposia, but without the muscle to impose it.44 After words,
in short, how can international lawyers assure the violence to back them up, in
a postmodern world where this linkage cannot be assumed?45
"Never again!" swore world leaders after World War 11.46 Drawing on
the political will that had been pooled long enough to win the war, they were
able to "project . . . an imagined future upon reality' '47 in the form of an
international legal order.48 The words of the U.N. Charter49 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, along with the conventions which would bedrafted to implement them,51 would assure that genocide and crimes against
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 807, 807 (1993) (observing that "Robert Cover taught us that law is itself a story").
41. See text accompanying supra note 2. "Groping for legal responses marks an effort to
embrace or renew the commitment to replace violence with words and terror with fairness. The legal
response may seem puny and always insufficient after massacres, state-sponsored tortures, systematic
raping of groups of women, bombing of children." Minow, supra note 34, at 2.
42. Cover, supra note 2, at 1613 passim. See also Fareed Zakaria, There's More to Right Than
Might, NEwSwEEK, July 9, 2001, at 43 (quoting the Greek historian Thucydides, who noted over two
thousand years ago that "the standard ofjustice depends on... the power to compel').
43. See text accompanying supra note 2.
44. See Trimble, supra note 16, at 823 ("A key to restoring credibility to the discipline [of
international law] is to connect this branch of law with its political base.").
45. Cover, in contrast, focuses on the American criminal justice system, where this linkage is
so entrenched as to be invisible. See supra note 2, at 1607.
46. This was the crie de coeur of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, see infra note 139; the
drafters of the Universal Declaration, see infra notes 48 & 51; the survivors of the Holocaust, see infra
notes 127-129. See also Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 (1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
47. Cover, supra note 2, at 1604.
48. For an account of the process through which they did so, written by a participant, see
JOHN P. HUMPHREYS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE (1984).
49. U.N. CHARTER.
50. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
51. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
entered into force Jan. 12 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 278. While the Universal Declaration was aspirational, it
was understood that a legally binding instrument would be drafted later. See COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, 2 BUILDING PEACE: REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
ORGANIZATION OF PEACE 1939-1977, at 641 (1973). In 1952, however, the U.N. General Assembly
decided that two instruments would be necessary "because of the East/West split and the ideological
disagreement over the value of socioeconomic rights." David P. Forsythe, Book Review, 8 HUM. RTS. Q.
540 (1986). The conventions eventually drafted include: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Civil Covenant]; International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Economic
Covenant]. The Universal Declaration and the covenants drafted to implement it are sometimes referred
to as the "International Bill of Rights."
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humanity never again took place. Several genocides later,52 however, the
phrase is fatally tinged with irony.53 But the atrocities do not stop and they
cannot be ignored.5  As Cover understood, the linkage of violence and the
word, the recreation of nomos, is an ongoing project. Every new atrocity is a
wake-up call, like Lola's ever-ringing phone, exhorting us to begin again.
I. PIL's ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
While "many doubt whether the term [postmodernism] can ever be
dignified by conceptual coherence," 55 three concepts widely viewed as
characteristically postmodern are particularly pertinent here. First, as Jean
Frangois Lyotard explains, postmodernism is "incredulity toward
metanarratives. 56  Second, as critic Fredric Jameson points out,
postmodernism is the "cultural logic of late capitalism. 5  Third, as
geographer David Harvey observes, "The most startling fact about
postmodernism . . . [is] its total acceptance of . . . ephemerality,
fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic." 58 These three distinct but
related concepts, like Lola's three scenarios, embody PIL's assumptions about
the nature of international law, as well as its multiple and contradictory
possibilities.
PIL's "incredulity toward metanarratives" leads it to question
international law's reliance on the Enlightenment and to challenge Western
hegemony. By situating international law within the "cultural logic of late
capitalism," PIL shows how international law shapes, and is shaped by,
commodification and globalization. PIL's "total acceptance of fragmentation"
highlights the fragmentation of international law in this context, shatters the
underlying assumption of a universal standard, and suggests that to the extent
international law blames violations of human dignity on the fragmentation of
states, it takes a very statist perspective.
52. See MiNow, supra note 34, at 27-29 (describing "[t]he failure of international bodies to
craft a legal response to the mass murders in Cambodia, South Africa, and Kurdistan, just to name a
few').
53. See Alkalaj, supra note 16 (noting the ineffectiveness of the United Nations); Makau Wa
Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and the Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COan,. L.
J. 167 (1997). Cf. Cover, supra note 28, at 7 ("[Since Roe v. Wade and Furman v. Georgia,] both for
opponents of abortion and for opponents of capital punishment the principle that 'no person shall be
deprived of life without due process of law' has assumed an ironic cast. The future of this particular
precept is now freighted with that irony no less than with the precedents of Roe and Furman
themselves.").
54. "Yet silence is also an unacceptable offense, a shocking implication that the perpetrators
in fact succeeded, a stunning indictment that the present audience is simply the current incarnation of the
silence of bystanders complicit with the oppressive regime." MNINOW, supra note 34, at 5. See also infra
Part LC.2, Lex Ferenda (explaining why atrocities cannot be ignored in various contexts).
55. Boyne & Rattansi, supra note 18, at 9.
56. JEAN-FRAN;OIs LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE
xxiv (GeoffBennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
57. See FREDRIC JAMESON, THE CULTURALLOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991).
58. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF
CULTURAL CHANGE 44 (1989).
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A. Incredulity Toward Metanarratives
1. The Dark Side of the Enlightenment
Like international human rights law, postmodernism is often linked to
the discovery of the death camps after World War I1.59 International law
responded by drafting new laws that drew on the -Enlightemnent .
Postmodernists such as Theodor Adorno, in contrast, questioned the role of
the Enlightenment project itself in the Holocaust.61 The "final solution" was
not, after all, a barbarian rampage but an orderly, systematic "scientific"
program of genocide-authoritarian, bureaucratic and perversely "rational. 62
The dark side of the Enlightenment was the reification of reason and the
march towards a universal society.63 This was all too evident to Adorno in
contemporary Stalinism and fascism.64 As recent observers have noted, the
59. Human rights law and postmodem theory were both reactions to the camps, drawing on
very different traditions. For postmodemism's pre-World War II antecedents, see NIETZSCHE AS
POSTMODERNIST: ESSAYS PRO AND CONTRA (Clayton Koelb ed., 1990). For an even earlier iteration, see
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990) (describing ancient Greek skeptics).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51. "International law has seen itself as the voice of
civilization, of the center, of the modem, of the future, and of universal humanism and progress against,
or in dialog with, the voices of the non-Christian world, the primitive, underdeveloped, non-Western,
outlaw world of those who do not yet see things from a high place." Kennedy, supra note 20, at 359. See
generally ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST (1989).
61. See THEODOR ADORNO & MAX HoRKHEvmR, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (John
Cummings trans., 1972). See also GILLIAN ROSE, THE MELANCHOLY SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE THOUGHT OF THEODOR W. ADORNO 19 (1978) ("Nietzsche, according to Adomo, refused
'complicity with the world' which ... comes to mean rejecting the prevalent norms and values of
society on the grounds that they have come to legitimise a society that in no way corresponds to them-
they have become 'lies.") (citations omitted). According to John Gray, the Enlightenment contemplated
"the creation of a single worldwide civilization" and the United States, "the last great power to base its
policies on this enlightenment thesis," seeks the global domination of democratic capitalism, a "single
universal free market." JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 2 (1998).
62. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998) (arguing that states seek to make the life of society "legible" in
order to make it controllable by political power). According to Rorty, the notion of humans as rational
"accounts for the residual popularity of Kant's astonishing claim that sentimentality has nothing to do
with morality, that there is something distinctively and transculturally human called 'the sense of moral
obligation' which has nothing to do with love, friendship, trust, or social solidarity." Richard Rorty,
Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY
LECTURES 111, 122 (1993) (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). Santos argues that law is the
"alter ego" of science. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 4 (1995).
63. One commentator describes how Nietzsche exposed the Enlightenment "as the unity of
reason and domination." ROSE, supra note 61, at 20. In In the Wake of Empire, similarly, Nathaniel
Berman links the surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945 to anti-French (anti-colonial) riots in Algeria.
Nathanial Berman, The Grotius Lecture Series, 14 AM. U. INT'LL. REy. 1521 (1999).
64. Both espoused noble ideas which masked a very different reality. Human rights advocates
note a disturbingly similar gap between theory and practice. Alves describes a "deeply humanistic form
of rational environmentalism, difficult to oppose, that now seems to prevail among all actors-no matter
how sadly limited the implementation of its recommendations may have been so far" (emphasis added).
J. A. Lindgren Alves, The United Nations, Postmodernity, and Human Rights, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 479,
496 (1998). This may be understood as part of a general disillusionment. "In Europe at the start of the
20th century most people accepted the authority of morality .... Reflective Europeans were also able to
believe in moral progress, and to see human viciousness and barbarism as in retreat. At the end of the
century, it is hard to be confident either about the moral law or about moral progress." JONATHAN
GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY 1 (2000).
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dangers are not limited to those particular totalizing cultures. The dark side of
the Enlightenment can be seen, for example, in what Richard Falk describes as
"the dirty hands of our own governing process when it comes to such matters
as . . . the moral scandal of financing and promoting terrorism in Central
America.
65
The Enlightenment made "man" rather than God the center of the
universe. But critics have charged that its purportedly universal, objective,
rational subject is in fact a Western white man,66 and its promised Utopia the
universalization of Western culture.67 Just as the Enlightenment sought to
justify the power of Western culture,6  and its devastating legacy of
imperialism, post-Cold War international law seeks to justify the power of late
capitalism,69 which seems to be conspicuously less vigilant about "violations
of human dignity" if cheap oil is at stake.70 By challenging the Enlightenment
metanarrative, PIL challenges Western hegemony, culturally and politically.71
65. RICHARD FALK, EXPLORATIONS AT THE EDGE OF TIME: THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD
ORDER 10 (1992). See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202,207 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting
claim against the Reagan Administration for torts arising out of United States covert action in
Nicaragua). None of the participants discussed United States involvement in Central America, for
example, because merely "training" terrorists is not a violation of humanitarian law, as the Intemational
Court of Justice observed in Nicaragua v. United States Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27) (Judgment). The United States was outraged, however, when it learned
that the capacity to train terrorists was not the exclusive prerogative of superpowers. See, eg., The
System Strikes Back, WALL ST. 1., Aug. 21, 1998, at A14 (endorsing U.S. bombings in the Sudan and
Afghanistan and urging "follow-through"). Even though Osama bin Laden had the money to train
terrorists, he never sought to justify such training in the name of "democracy" or any other 'right."
Rather, he invoked "Islam." As Karen Engle notes, "[Culture and universal rights provide the discourse
for a number of debates. In these debates, culture is both as indeterminate and as powerful as rights."
Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 291, 293 (2000).
66. This Westem-centricism is reflected in the notion that "[w]hat [is] good for [America is]
good for the world." Berman, supra note 63, at 1532 (quoting Abe Fortas). "Postmodemism questions
the integrity, the coherence, and the actual identity of the humanist individual self. . . . For
postmodernism, this humanist individual subject is a construction of text, discourses, and institutions.
The promise that this particular human agent would realize freedom, autonomy, etc. has turned out to be
just so much Kant." PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOwN TE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE
AMIERICAN LEGAL MIND 24 (1996).
67. See, e.g., Edward W. Said, Yeats and Decolonization, in NATIONALISM, COLONIALISM,
AND LITERATURE 69-71 (Terry Eagleton et al. 1990) ("By the beginning of World War I, Europe and
America held 85% of the earth's surface in some sort of colonial subjugation. This, I hasten to add, did
not happen in a fit of absentminded whimsy or as a result of a distracted shopping spree.").
68. See, e.g., Kennedy, ThinkingAgainst the Box, supra note 20, at 441.
69. See JAMESON, supra note 57; cf. Eve Darian-Smith, Power in Paradise: The Political
Implications of Santos 's Utopia, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRy 81, 86 (1998) (concluding that Santos's goal "is,
above all, modernist: it conceals relations of power in the march toward emancipation of the
oppressed").
70. See, e.g., Glenn Frankel, Nigeria Mixes Oil and Money: A Potent Formula Keeps US.
Sanctions at Bay, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1996, at Cl, C4 (describing how Nigeria avoided sanctions
after hanging the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other political activists); Nadine Gordimer, In
Nigeria, The Price for Oil is Blood, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at All (arguing that "the questions of
freedom of the press and expression in Nigeria have become an issue for Nigerians and for those of us
... who know that if, in what is optimistically called the Global Village, the lines go down in one street
the power failure is the responsibility of all inhabitants"); and Seymour M. Hersh, Overwhelming Force,
THE NEw YORKER, May 22, 2000, at 48 (describing attack, in violation of the Geneva Conventions, on
Iraqi troops that had already surrendered). See also Norman Kempster, Rights Group Calls U.S. Blind to
Saudi Abuses, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at A4 (reporting that Amnesty International accuses the U.S.
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2. A Postmodernism ofResistance
Such challenges are crucial in the context of individual accountability
for violations of human dignity because they make us question our own
assumptions on an ongoing basis. A key premise of the post-war international
order72 was that human rights law would prevent such violations. PIL
questions this premise, but does not necessarily reject it.
While postmodemism may lead to "the black hole of relativism,"73 there
is a "postmodernism of 'resistance' as well as a postmodernism of 'reaction,"'
as Roy Boyne and Ali Rattansi observe.74 Thus, PIL accepts the premise that
more human rights means fewer violations of human dignity but it does so
contingently, always insisting that the premise be recognized as "tentative,
relational and unstable.",75 PIL is grounded in what Katherine Bartlett has
called "standpoint epistemology," that is, critical assessment based on
of ignoring human rights violations by Saudi Arabia because of its economic clout). As I have argued
elsewhere, to the extent international law conflates "free market democracy" with human rights, it
conflates profit with human good. Stark, Women and Globalization, supra note 19, at 550. Profits are
human goods, some of our law and economics friends quickly counter. While it is clear that this is
sometimes true, at least for some, it is equally clear that it is not always true for everyone. See id. at 513-
14 (describing human cost of structural adjustment programs in Mexico). The tail is wagging the dog
when Freedom has, quite literally, become a product: a perfume manufactured by Tommy Hilfiger and
advertised by silhouettes of"freedom"-loving young people, arms raised in triumph, at what looks like a
rock concert (or an Amnesty International benefit). See Press Release, July 30, 1999, Tommy Hilfiger to
Join Forces with Virgin Recording Artist Lenny Kravitz for Fall 1999 Freedom Tour, available at
http://www.tommy.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
71. Some of the other methods do the same, depending, of course, on who is wielding them.
See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 12, at 383 ("International law asserts a generality and universality
that can appear strikingly incongruous in an international community made up of almost two hundred
different nationalities and many more cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic groups.").
72. See supra notes 50-51. This was the law adopted to effectuate the post-war "Never again!"
See supra Part I. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recently reiterated,
"[International criminal law to deter genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity... will only be
effective if accompanied by measures to deliver all human rights to all people." Mary Robinson,
Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 275, 283 (1999). See also
STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITmS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 24-25 (1996) (concluding that application of
Western norms is "ethically appropriate because of the fundamental universality of human rights law...
[as evidenced by] the acceptance by States of a right of oversight by international organizations over
domestic human rights practices, the signature by non-Western States of numerous human rights
conventions, and UN attempts to expand these norms ... ").
73. Alan Stone, Questions and Comments, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT HARVARD 55, 59 (1997).
While some postmodernists relentlessly challenge normativity, see Pierre Schlag, Foreword:
Postmodernism and Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 439, 444-45 (1991), others concede that the processes of
questioning, trashing, deconstructing, "always do stop." J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal and the
Politics ofDeconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1627 (1990).
74. BOYNE & RATrANSI, supra note 18, at 29. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 360
(stating that to describe legal method as style "may be assumed to lead to an 'anything goes' cynical
skepticism, the giving up of political struggle and the adoption of an attitude of blas6 relativism. This
would, however, presuppose the internalization of an unhistorical and reified conception of the
postmodern in which the truth of skepticism would be the only truth not vulnerable to that skepticism.").
As Glover similarly notes, "People's projects of self-creation may be guided by quite different values
from [Nietzsche's]." Glover, supra note 64, at 17.
75. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
586 (1990).
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ongoing experience and critical reflection informed by that experience. 76 PIL
observes, for example, that human rights law has tacitly expanded to include
neo-liberal trade rights. 7 Thus, entrepreneurs have had the "right" to mine
diamonds that fund civil wars in Africa.
78
Interrogating the premises of international law reminds us of our own
complicity and our own historical roles in the nightmare we come to judge.79
It reminds us that the dark side may not be that which we can project onto the
Other, the demonized war criminal,80 but part of the human heart.81 It exposes
such projections as an exercise of power, and even a denial of the Other's
humanity.8
2
76. Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990). As I have
explained elsewhere, "postmodemists can and do support human rights, but they make the linkage
between rights and concrete experience explicit and direct, insisting on contingency and ongoing
interrogation. Thus, while postmodemism does not preclude a bottom line, it insists on bottom lines that
are unstable and that may vary from place to place and over time to reflect shifting consensus and
ongoing dialogue." Stark, Women and Globalization, supra note 19, at 555-56. See also Diane Otto,
Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 5 (arguing for
"universality understood as dialogue, in a sense of struggle, rather than as a disciplinary civilizing
mission of Europe").
77. Stark, Women and Globalization, supra note 19, at 532-40.
78. See, e.g., Robert Block, You Can Learn A Lot About a Diamond If You Smash It Up,
WALL ST. J., July 12, 2000, at I (describing the dilemma of De Beer, the world's largest diamond
company, which is trying to develop a method for determining the origins of diamonds so as to avoid
"blood diamonds," gems that come from African war zones.) The article reports:
In the past, Liberia, Namibia and Mobutu's Zaire have been caught up in such conflicts. Now it
is Angola, Sierra Leone and the renamed Democratic Republic of Congo that are being ripped
apart by wars funded indirectly by engagement rings, necklaces and diamond tiaras. The industry
is under pressure from human rights groups, the World Bank, the United Nations and policy
makers in Washington to squeeze the illicit trade in these diamonds out of the business.
Id. See also Blaine Harden, The Dirt in the New Machine, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 12, 2001, at 35
(explaining why high-tech corporations need coltan, which is plentiful in what is left of Congo).
79. See, e.g., Jos6 Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 365, 440 (1999) (noting that in addition to the complicity of the colonizers, see infra note 222,
"the circle of blame extends much wider and includes Kofi Annan, who ignored warnings of the
impending genocide; all members of the UN, and particularly the Security Council, who, in the wake of
the fiasco of Somalia, failed to send the 5,000 troops that, it is estimated, might have prevented the vast
majority of the killings... ").
80. See Special Report: Mlosevic, The Face of Evil, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 1999. As Guido
Calabresi observed at the memorial service for Professor Cover at the Yale Law School, "[H]e
understood instinctively how destructive passion can be if it does not forgive and even love those
individuals on whom it must-on whom it must-turn its fire." Calabresi, supra note 38, at 1699-1700.
81. As psychologist Alan Stone notes, "You have to admit that your group is capable of equal
violence... horrors are perpetrated by all sides." Stone, supra note 73, at 55, 59. See also GLOVER,
supra note 64, at 7 ("We need to look hard and clearly at some monsters inside us. But this is part of the
project of caging and taming them.'); Carlos Salinas, People Like Us, AMNESTY NOW, Fall 2000, at 12
(describing test in which volunteers were told to shock supposed test subjects-who were really
actors-notwithstanding the subjects' screams: "ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, without any
particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terribly destructive process"); cf. Steven Pinker,
All About Evil, N.Y. TIMES BK. REV., Oct. 29, 2000, at 14 (reviewing JONATHAN GLOVER, HuMANrrY:
A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTmTH CENTURY (2000)) (describing resolution promulgated by
UNESCO in 1986 that "it is scientifically incorrect to say that war or any other violent behavior is
genetically programmed into our human nature"). As Pinker notes, "Scientists who have dissented from
this saccharine view have been picketed, smeared, and likened to Nazis." Id. at 14. See generally A
GLIMPSE OF HELL: REPORTS ON TORTURE WORLD WIDE (Duncan Forrest ed., 1996).
82. "The response should resist the temptation to dehumanize perpetrators and instead seek to
confirm the humanity of everyone-whether by holding all to account under basic norms of human
rights, by including all in a process of truth-telling and healing, or by forging connections through rituals
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3. The Limits of Theory
Postmodern incredulity toward metanarratives also exposes the limits of
theory. Philosopher Jonathan Glover expounds upon the theory underlying the
linkage of human rights and the prevention of atrocities in a recent book
focusing on Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda.83 Glover argues that the crimes
of genocide, mass murder, disap earance, and torture become possible when
their victims are dehumanizedN and that dehumanization occurs through
repeated and increasingly vicious "violations of human dignity." Indeed, once
a certain level of dehumanization is reached, these crimes become almost
inevitable.
The relatively petty violations of human dignity through which victims
are dehumanized often include mockery and what Glover calls the "cold
joke., 85 These violations may be culturally specific, and what may be an
intolerable insult in one culture may be shrugged off in another. As these
violations become increasingly egregious, however, they increasingly fall
within the prohibitions of well-established human rights law. The exhortations
on Hutu-controlled radio to kill Tutsis,8 6 for example, violated article 21 of the
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(prohibiting hate speech and incitement to violence).87 The camps into which
Croat and Muslim civilians were herded,88 similarly, violated well-accepted
international norms against arbitrary detention89 and international standards
for the treatment of those in state custody.90
and monuments of commemoration, shared resources, or offers of apology and forgiveness." MINoW,
supra note 34, at 146.
83. See generally GLOVER, supra note 64.
84. Id. at 35 ("Atrocities are easier if the human responses are weakened. Torturers have to
suppress sympathy, or 'squeamishness' as they come to think of it. One way is to stress that victims do
not belong. They are usually assigned to some other, stigmatized, group.").
85. "Among the strongest expressions of lack of respect is the cold joke. During the
occupation of Kuwait, some Iraqis who had killed a boy told his family they wanted money to pay for
the bullet. They could have simply forced Kuwaitis at random to give them money. The added cruel
humor in this demand is what makes it a cold joke. The language used by people carrying out atrocities
is riddled with cold jokes." GLOVER, supra note 64, at 36. ANDREA DwoRKiN & CATHERINE
MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988) (arguing
that pornography should be illegal); Cf MARl MATSUDA, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Richard Delgado & Charles R. Lawrence
eds., 1993) (arguing that hate speech should be banned).
86. Bill Berkeley, Radio in Rwanda: The Sounds of Silence, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 754 (Henry Steiner & Philip Alston, eds., 2000)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT] (describing the demonization of Tutsis);
Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, International Cirminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, Sept. 2, 1998, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra, at
1181.
87. Civil Covenant, supra note 51, art. 20.
88. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 86, at 1158 (summarizing
testimony before the Trial Chamber of the ICTY as to the "very confined space ... filth and stifling
heat" in which up to 3,000 prisoners were held).
89. Civil Covenant, supra note 51, art. 9. But see Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th
Cir. 1986) (upholding the prolonged detention of Cuban refugees notwithstanding the violation of
customary international law), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
90. Civil Covenant, supra note 51, art. 10.
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In short, just as genocide-perhaps the ultimate violation of human
rights?'-may be understood as the complete absence of any recognition of
human dignity,92 at the opposite end of the spectrum, where human rights are
fully assured, human dignity is given fullest recognition.93 According to the
modem metanarrative, international law discourages genocide, the complete
denial of human dignity, on the one hand, by encouraging the fullest
recognition of human dignity through human rights law, on the other.
PIL recognizes the persuasive force of this argument, but also notes its
limitations. Genocide may be more dependably deterred by violating human
rights, by imposing curfews or even preventive detention, for example.
94
Genocide has occurred, moreover, without the apparent accretion of
indignities, as in the Polish village of Jedwabne in which half the population
murdered the other half.95 Genocide may also be accompanied by the most
meticulous attention to law, as the Nazis demonstrated and documented
through their careful promulgation of regulations and orders governing
treatment of the Jews. Finally, as Adeno Addis and others have noted, there
are important aspects of human dignity which are generally ignored by human
rights law, such as the collective rights of particular cultural groups.97 As
Martha Minow soberly concludes, "No one, of course, knows how to deter
genocide or mass violence."
98
91. The ICTR calls genocide "the crime of crimes." Judgment and Sentence, The Prosecutor
v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Sept. 4,1998, cited in WILLIAMA. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONALLAW: THE CRIME OF CRIES
9 n.30 (2000).
92. The victim effectively becomes an object As Oscar Schachter notes:
We do not find an explicit definition of the expression 'dignity of the human person' in
international instruments or (as far as I know) in national law. Its intrinsic meaning has been left
to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large part by cultural factors.... One general answer
to our question is suggested by the Kantian injunction to treat every human being as an end, not
as a means. Respect for the intrinsic worth of every person should mean that individuals are not
to be perceived or treated merely as instruments or objects of the will of others.
Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848, 849 (1983).
93. See MARCO SASs6u & ANTOINE A. BoUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 100-
101 (2000) (noting that some version of the Golden Rule is recognized in virtually every moral tradition
on the planet). Freud was more cynical. After demonstrating that this "ideal demand . . . known
throughout the world" is counterintuitive if not absurd, Freud concludes "that the ideal commandment to
love one's neighbor as oneself... is really justified by the fact that nothing else runs so strongly counter
to the original nature of man." Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, reprinted in THE FREUD
READER 750 (Peter Gay ed., 1989).
94. The most extreme example of such prevention is humanitarian intervention in the form of
armed force to prevent genocide, as NATO justified its attacks on Serbia in March 1999. The legality of
such intervention remains an open question. SCHABAS, supra note 91, at 447.
95. JAN GROSS, NEIGHBORS (2001). See also George F. Will, July 10, 1941, In Jedwabne,
NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2001, at 68. But see Freud, supra note 93, at 751-52 (explaining how Jews "have
rendered most useful services" to their host countries by providing an outlet for aggression, thus
facilitating cohesion among their countrymen). See also STAN MACK, THE STORY OF THE JEWS 140-43
(1998) (describing persecution of Jews in Poland in the 16th and 17th centuries).
96. SUSAN GRIFFIN, A CHORUS OF STONES (1993) (describing the endless detail of Nazi law);
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 201 passim
(1992).
97. Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitaranism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1219 (1996).
98. MINOW, supra note 34, at 145. Nor do we know why some heroically resist. See, e.g.,
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In addition, PIL exposes the underlying assumptions of homogeneity on
which much of international legal theory is predicated. 99 PIL recognizes that
amnesty, for example, may well be useful, even necessary, in South Africa 1
and a cynical mechanism to immunize violators in Peru.101 The fact that most
methods similarly recognize a range of amnesties, rather than a dichotomy
between our amnesty-compassionate, pragmatic, and just-and their
amnesty-cynical, self-serving, and unjust (a predictable dichotomy during
the Cold War), simply indicates the extent to which "we're all postmodernists
now."
102
Finally, by exposing the limits of theory, postmodern incredulity
suggests a shift in focus from theory-building to storytelling. 103 Stories give
meaning to phrases like "violations of human dignity" and, as philosopher
Richard Rorty explains, stories generate the "sympathy" crucial to a human
rights culture:"0
PHILIP HALLIE, LEST INNOCENT BLOOD BE SHED: THE STORY OF LE CHAMBON AND How GOODNESS
HAPPENED THERE (1979) (describing how a tiny French Protestant village saved thousands of Jews
during World War 1).
99. But see Kennedy, supra note 20, at 387 ("Never has the U.S. international law tradition
seemed as idiosyncratic or been in such sustained methodological and political debate with international
lawyers in other traditions. There is no consensus on the meaning or consequences of changes in
international society.").
100. South Africa's constitutional court explains:
The alternative to the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution of offenders is to
keep intact the abstract right to such a prosecution for particular persons without the
evidence to sustain the prosecution successfully, to continue to keep the dependants of
such victims ... ignorant about what precisely happened to their loved ones, to leave
their yearning for the truth effectively unassuaged, to perpetuate their legitimate sense of
resentment and grief and ... to allow the culprits ... [to remain] physically free but
inhibited in their capacity to become active, full and creative members of the new order.
Azanian Peoples Organization v. The President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR 637
(CC) (S. Afr.), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 633 (1999). See also Antonio Cassese,
Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REv. 3 (1998) (delivering a laudatory analysis
of the Azanian Peoples Organization decision by a judge who sat on the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
and the ICTR).
101. See, e.g., Preliminary Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/79/add.67 (1996), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 100, at 496 (noting that "the amnesty
granted by decree law 26,479 on 14 June 1995 absolves from criminal responsibility... all forms of
accountability, all military, police and civilian agents of the State... accused, investigated, charged,
processed or convicted for common and military crimes [from May 1980 to June 1995]").
102. See NATHAN GLAZER, WE'RE ALL MULTICULTURALIsTs Now (1997); Schlag, supra note
73, at 444 (noting that the law is already postmodem).
s 103. Rorty describes the process through which he manipulates his students' "sentiments in
such a way that they imagine themselves in the shoes of the despised and oppressed. Such students are
already so nice that they are eager to define their identity in non-exclusionary terms .... Producing
generations of nice, tolerant, well-off, secure, other-respecting students of this sort in all parts of the
world is just what is needed-indeed all that is needed-to achieve an Enlightenment utopia." Rorty,
supra note 62, at 127. But see SCHLAG, supra note 66, at 17, 20 (referring ironically to "those scholars
who have figured out what should be done-for example, we should all be really nice to each other-
but haven't the foggiest idea of how we should go about doing it").
104. Rorty argues that resistance to "the human rights culture" is usually traceable to the
deprivation "of two ... concrete things: security and sympathy. By 'security' I mean conditions of life
sufficiently risk free as to make one's difference from others inessential to one's self-respect, one's
sense of worth ... by 'sympathy' I mean the sort of reaction that... white Americans had more of after
reading Uncle Tom 's Cabin than before, the sort that we have more of after watching TV programs
about the genocide in Bosnia." Rorty, supra note 62, at 128. As Saskia Sassen and Ted Turner have
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A better sort of answer [than philosophy] is the sort of long, sad, sentimental story which
begins, 'because this is what it is like to be in her situation-to be far from home, among
strangers'.. . such stories, repeated and varied over the centuries, have induced us, the
safe, rich, powerful people, to tolerate, and even to cherish, powerless people.1
0 5
Most of the methods set out in the symposium contemplate such stories, but
they focus on ferreting out the "true story."10 6 PIL, in contrast, focuses on the
multiplicity of stories. This does not mean accepting all stories as equally
valid, 10 7 but it does mean recognizing multiple truths.10 8
In the recently published story of Konrad Latte, for example, we learn
how he-along with about 2000 other Jews-survived World War II in
Berlin.10 9 As journalist Peter Schneider observes, "For every Jew who
survived in Berlin, at least 7 people must have intervened .... We will never
know how many Berliners had the decency and courage to save their Jewish
co-citizens from the Nazis-20,000, 30,000? '110 Thus, this story takes its
place along with Daniel Goldhagen's stories of Hitler's Willing
Executioners1 and innumerable stories of a fascist state so omnipresent, so
relentless, that no German could possibly resist. The new story does not mean
observed, the whole world is watching. See SASKI SASSEN, LosiNG CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE
OF GLOBALIZATION 93 n.3 (1996); Sharing the Wealth (NPR radio broadcast, June 13, 2000) (reporting
on advice from Ted Turner and John Chambers to Silicon Valley's newly rich on sharing their wealth,
noting Turner's admonition to pay attention to those regions and countries rarely seen on the evening
news). See also text accompanying infra note 319.
105. Rorty, supra note 62, at 133-34.
106. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 9, at 346-47 (explaining why crimes under the grave
breaches regime that are not recognized as such under CIL must be "carefudly exclude[d]" from
indictments); wiessner & Willard, supra note 8, at 323. But see Charlesworth, supra note 12, at 380
(explaining that feminist methodologies "may clearly reflect a political agenda rather than strive to attain
an objective truth"). See generally Julie Mertus, Considering Non-State Actors in the New Millennium:
Toward Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 537, 565 (2000) ("People mold their identities and determine their behavior according to what they
perceive to be true, not according to what is factually true.").
107. Alvarez, supra note 79, at 443 (noting that the "vast bulk of the evidence in the Tadic case
came, not in the form of physical evidence, such as contemporaneous written records of atrocities (as at
Nuremberg), but rather through the oral testimony of self-interested, live witnesses who replicated inside
the courtroom the ethnic divides of the society at large .... Tadic's judges reacted to these challenges in
the time-honored fashion of judges in liberal states--they pretended such strains did not exist"). Cf.
Ethan Bronner, Nemesis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at 9 (book review of RICH CoHN, THE AVENGERS
(2000) (criticizing the author for his failure to provide footnotes, or any authority, for his account of a
plot to poison Nazis after the war and concluding that "[h]e wants only to tell a good story. This is a pity
because what could have been a thrilling and authoritative work remains thrilling alone.').
108. Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16
HUM. RTS. Q. 598, 636-39 (1994) (describing "what commissions have included (and not included) in
their investigations"). Id. at 638.
109. Peter Schneider, Saving Konrad Latte, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 13, 2000, at 52
("Historians estimate that between 5,000 and 10,000 German Jews went underground before and during
the war, about half of them in Berlin; about 2,000 Jews actually lived out the war in Berlin.. .").
110. Id. See also Roger Cohen, Germany Quietly Builds Alliance With Israel, N.Y. TIvES, Mar.
4, 2001, at I (noting that "for decades hundreds of German volunteers have traveled to Israel to provide
services to Holocaust survivors").
111. DANIEL GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS (2000) (describing complicity of
German civilians in the Holocaust).
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that the others are untrue, but it subverts their claims of ubiquity and, in doing
so, contributes to a more complex, nuanced understanding. I
B. "The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism"
In Fredric Jameson's oft-quoted phrase, "postmodernism is the cultural
logic of late capitalism." 113 This "cultural logic" has two related but distinct
manifestations: commodification and globalization. Commodification refers to
the transformation of something which is not commonly sold, traded or
otherwise alienated-love, water, rituals of indigenous cultures-into
something that is-mail-order brides, bottled water, $50 per head
"performances."' 1 4 Globalization, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos explains, is
"the process by which a given local condition or entity succeeds in expanding
its reach over the globe and, by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a
rival social condition or entity as local."' 15  By packaging culture,
commodification makes globalization possible. By creating markets,
globalization makes commodification profitable.
Thus, along with dollars, Western culture is flowing freely around the
world. Along with Coca Cola and Bruce Willis, 117 western culture means
112. See also Cohen, supra note 110, at 10 (explaining how "Germany has become Israel's
most important ally outside the United States").
113. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM
(1991). Pursuant to this logic, free market democracy calls for the elimination of trade barriers and the
opening of markets to Western capital. Capital has flowed freely for most of Western history, but the
end of the Cold War and developments in finance and technology combined to qualitatively change the
game during the past ten years. "Securitization and the ascendance of finance generally have farther
stimulated the global circulation of capital and the search for investment opportunities worldwide .. "
SASSEN, supra note 104, at 37. See also Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2
HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 19, 21-22 (1997) (describing the revolution in global communications and
its impact on financial systems).
114. GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS: CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION AND INNOVATION 13 (Jan
Jenson & Boaventurave de Sousa Santos eds. 2000) [hereinafter GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS]
(describing "vemacularization of historical religious sites for tourists").
115. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Oppositional Postmodernism and Globalization, 23 L. &
Soc. INQUIRY 121, 135 (1998). This point is elaborated by Jenson and de Sousa Santos:
Most frequently, the story of globalization is that of the winners, as told by the winners.
The victory of their vision of the future is recounted as an inevitability. In the last two
decades globalizations follow-to hear the victors tell it-not only from heavy
tendencies of economic structures but also from the lucky escape from misguided
political vision which sought to achieve social justice and equality via state act and
mobilization of the economically and socially disadvantaged after 1945.
GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 114, at 12. SASSEN, supra note 104, at 19 ('The most widely
recognized instance of Americanization is seen, of course, in the profound influence of U.S. popular
culture on global culture."). The end of the Cold War accelerated the rate of globalization. The failure of
Soviet communism became the triumph of free market democracy as formerly closed markets opened
and capital poured in at previously unimaginable rates. See Nicholas D. Kristof & Edward Wyatt, Who
Went Under in the World's Sea ofCash, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at A10 ("In a typical day, S1.5
trillion changes hands, an eight-fold increase since 1986, an almost incomprehensible sum, equivalent to
total world trade for four months."). As Huyssen argues, "Especially with the help of the new
technological media of reproduction and dissemination monopoly capitalism has succeeded in
swallowing up all forms of older popular cultures, in homogenizing all and any local or regional
discourses, and in stifling by co-option any emerging resistances to the rule of the commodity."
HUYSSEN, supra note 20, at 21.
116. As Professor Falk observes, "'Western' [has been] further deconstructed to be seen as
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constitutionalism 8 and free market ideology.n 9 Mass production of goods
has been succeeded by the mass production of images 120 and information,
from the Golden Arches to MTV, proliferating in endless iterations around the
world. Images of "freedom" and the rhetoric of "rights" are hot
commodities,12 1 especially when they are linked, implicitly or explicitly, with
images of American prosperity.122
Commodification and globalization are in large part responsible for the
spread of the "human rights idea."'123 They can be constructively exploited, as
Amnesty International has effectively demonstrated with its celebrity
extravaganzas. 124 While some modernists may wince at Rockin'for Human
'American.' RICHARD FALK, EXPLORATIONS AT TE EDGE OF TIME: THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD
ORDER 49 (1992). For a description of the commodification of international law, see Stark, supra note
19, at 553 (describing the International Superstore).
117. Santos defines globalization as "the process by which a given local condition or entity
succeeds in expanding its reach over the globe and, by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a
rival social condition or entity as local." Sousa Santos, supra note 115, at 135. This definition is
reiterated in GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 114, at 11.
118. VicKi C. JACKSON & MARK TuSHNET, COMPARATE CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 249-50
(1999) (noting the role of international and "extra-national" influences on new constitutions).
119. Joseph Hanania, 'Reality' TV? Televisions Colonized Reality Long Ago, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
21, 2001, at AR41 (noting that the U.S. Department of Justice sent episodes of Law and Order to
Russian lawmakers in an effort to educate them about the American criminal justice system as they
drafted a new constitution in the early 1990s, "despite the fact that [the show's author] never attended
law school, [and] creates legal theories and precedents for the show 'out of whole cloth'); R.W. Apple,
Jr., In the Television Age Power By Image, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2001, at 1 (explaining why,
notwithstanding Gore's popular victory, "in the television age, [images of Mr. Bush speaking from the
Oval Office, boarding Air Force One, accompanied everywhere... by... "Hail to the Chief] more than
anything else, confer the mantle of authority and legitimacy on [him]"). The President's legitimacy-
and approval ratings-reached new heights when he addressed Congress, and the world, on television
after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Howard Fineman & Martha Brant, Bush's
Battle Cry, NEWSWFEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 24. See generally HuYSSEN, supra note 20, at ix.
120. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, NEv LEFr
REv., July-Aug. 1984, at 59. No one would invest in "Third World markets," for example, but the phrase
"emerging markets" has irresistible connotations of getting in on the ground floor. See Nicholas D.
Kristof & David E. Sanger, How US. Wooed Asia to Let Cash Flow In, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1999, at
Al.
121. David Rieff, The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 8, 1999,
at 37 ("In these post-communist, post-modem times, human rights seems to have become the dominant
moral narrative for thinking about world affairs.").
122. As Schlag points out, "[O]urs is a world.., where the value of freedom implies at once
the downfall of the Berlin Wall and the imbibing of Pepsi." SCrLAG, supra note 66, at 47. See also
supra note 70 (describing Freedom Perfume). Thomas Friedman cites advertisements throughout his
paean to neoliberalism, THOMAS L. FRiEDMAN, TiE LExus AND THE OLIVE TREE 381 (1999) (noting
without irony that "[f]or some reason, advertising copywriters have a tremendous insight into
globalization").
123. Anthony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial
Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 243, 250 n.14 (2000) ("Indeed it can be
argued that human rights itself is a manifestation of globalization in that it is a universal language that
creates communities and affiliations which transcend borders."). As Cover stressed, "It is the thesis of
this Foreword that the creation of legal meaning... takes place always through an essentially cultural
medium." Cover, supra note 28, at 11.
124. E.g., Screen Rights: Before Night Falls, AImNESTY NoW, Summer 2001, at 11 (describing
Winona Ryder, Dennis Hopper and Gary Oldman co-host benefit screening of Julian Schnabel's Before
Night Falls, "based on the autobiographical memoir of writer and activist Reinaldo Arenas, who was
persecuted and imprisoned by the Cuban government for his writings, his politics and his
homosexuality'); Stand and Be Counted (The Learning Channel television broadcast, Aug. 21-22, 2000)
(featuring musician David Crosby interviewing artists who use their talents to push for social change).
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Rights,125 it raises consciousness and it raises money, with which Amnesty
can continue to ratchet its public visibility in a series of high profile
advertisements. Indeed, this has been understood since the beginning of the
human rights movement which emerged not from the Holocaust but from
mass-marketed stories of the Holocaust, 126 the carefully-edited Diary ofAnne
Frank,127 Elie Weisel's Night, 12 and the grim lyricism of The Sorrow and the
Pity.129 Commodification contributes to respect for human dignity, it can be
125. Rockin 'for Human Rights, AMINESTY ACTION, Spring 1999, at 10 (describing the Pay-Per-
View cable network national premier of The Paris Concert for Amnesty International: The Struggle
Continues, featuring Bruce Springstein, Peter Gabriel, Tracy Chapman, Alanis Morrissette, RadioHead
and Shania Twain, among others, in a sold-out event to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, also describing tie-in with the Body Shop and Best Buy music and
appliance chain). The appropriation of human rights culture, which is in turn promoted by this
appropriation, illustrates what Jameson calls "pastiche":
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar mask, speech in a dead language; but
it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody's ulterior motives,
amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside
of the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic
normality still exists.
Jameson, supra note 120, at 64. Examples are ubiquitous. E.g., Slaughter & Ratner, supra note 1;
Koskenniemi, supra note 10; Slaughter & Ratner, infra note 143 (co-editors' unattributed reference to
Marshall McLuhan's "The Medium is the Message"); Pinker, supra note 81 (describing AllAbout Evil, a
play on AllAbout Eve). Another example is an old Saturday Night Live satire on the "feel good" politics
of the We Are the World recording. In the parody, famous rock stars get together to "free the chickens"
("All chickens should be free-range chickens!"). Yesterday's parody is today's pastiche. Factory farming
of chickens (as well as other animals) has in fact become an active campaign, not only by animal rights
groups, see PETER Sn'GER, ANIMAL LIBERATION ii-iii (2d ed. 1996), but by those alarmed at the spread
of disease among such animals in the recent hoof and mouth disaster in Europe. See e.g., Olivia Ward,
Paying the Price of Progress, THE TORONTO STAR, April 1, 2001 (noting links between factory farming
and foot and mouth, as well as mad cow, disease). In Chicken Run (DreamWorks 2000), a cartoon
rooster with the voice of Mel Gibson inspires a barracks full of cartoon chickens to escape their black-
booted oppressors, who have installed an ominous death machine that will efficiently make them all into
chicken pot pies. See also The Producers or, if tickets are unavailable, see Marc Peyser, 'Producers'
Tickets Here!, NEWSWEEK, June 18, 2001, at 54 (reporting that Mel Brooks thanked Hitler for being a
"funny guy" at the Tony Awards).
126. "The very imposition of a normative force upon a state of affairs, real or imagined, is the
act of creating narrative." Cover, supra note 28, at 10. As a corollary, when stories are not told,
normative force is not imposed. As Glover notes, "history is highly selective .... [S]ome places ... are
either hardly mentioned or quite unmentioned. This does not reflect a view that the history of some parts
of humanity is unimportant, but rather the limitations of what is well or availably documented."
GLOVER, supra note 64, at 2. Where are the made-for-TV movies about Rwanda?
127. See Ralph Blumenthal, Five Precious Pages Renew Wrangling Over Anne Frank, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998, at Al (describing Otto Frank's censorship of the diary of "the Jewish girl in
Amsterdam who put an indelible human face on the Holocaust").
128. ELm WIESEL, NIGHT (1958).
129. THE SORROW AND THE PITY (Cinema 5 Distributing 1971). See also Paragraph 175, a
documentary by Rob Epstein and Jeffrey Friedman describing the fate of German homosexuals under
the Nazis, reviewed in Review/Film, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2001, at W4 (including the testimony of a
survivor who "recalls, with hushed horror, a 'singing in the forest' that was, in fact, the screaming of gay
men being hanged. Another man is more succinct. 'I am ashamed,' he says, 'for humanity."). See
generally YEHUDA BAUER, RETHINKING THE HOLOCAUST (2000) (exploring the difficulties of writing
about genocide). But see NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, THE HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: REFLECIONS ON THE
EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING (2000) (arguing that the real threat to the sanctity of the memory of
the victims of Nazism is not from Holocaust deniers, but from self-proclaimed guardians of Holocaust
remembrance).
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argued, through high-grossing movies like Schindler's List,130 and tourist
attractions like the Holocaust Museum.13'
At the same time, the commodification of justice detracts from its
legitimacy. 132 Thus, ironically, commodification cheapens justice, even if it
costs billions. As commentator Charles Krauthammer notes, for example,
Milosevic lost the election because the "U.S. poured millions of dollars into
the democratic opposition"; he was arrested after "the U.S. Congress had
stipulated that unless Serbia showed cooperation... the U.S. would withhold
$50 million in reconstruction aid"; and he was surrendered on the eve of the
donors' conference on whether to grant aid.133 As Krauthammer says, "Money
talks.... These are the forces that brought Milosevic to justice."'134 Justice
may be blind, but as Manni realizes in the last scenario (when the blind
woman points to the fleeing figure with his bag of cash),135 it pays to keep an
eye on the money.
But the cultural logic of late capitalism takes on a life of its own, not
subject to anyone's control. 136 The impact of an image, technologically
enhanced, simultaneously available everywhere, whether "true" or not,
137
130. SCHINDLER's LIST (Universal Pictures 1993). As of August, 2001, Schindler's List had
grossed $317,100,000 worldwide, in addition to $44,364,000 from U.S. rentals. Business Data for
Schindler's List, available at http://us.imdb.com/Business?0108052 (last visited Aug. 10, 2001).
131. As of Feb. 2002, the Holocaust Museum in Washington had been visited by 17.3 million
people since opening in April 1993. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum General Museum
Information Press Kit, available at http://www.ushmm.org/museum/press/kits/general/fact.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2002). See also Celestine Bohlen, From a Mural, New Life in a Debate Over Memory,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at WK4 (describing revival in Poland of a "Jewish culture without Jews"
attributable, in part, to tourism, which will draw an anticipated 50,000 visitors to a Jewish center in
Poland that "seeks to recreate the past shared by Poles and Jews as seamless and painless-which it
most clearly was not. But still, there is an attempt to acknowledge the role of Jews and Jewish culture in
Poland, and can that be bad?"). Commodification takes a further ironic twist here as communities realize
the benefits of atrocity tourism and monuments to victims become an important part of rebuilding the
economy.
132. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGrriMAcY AMONG NATIONS 150 passim
(1990) (discussing coherence, that is, a principled and consistent approach to norm enforcement, as a
factor in legitimacy).
133. Charles Krauthammer, Milosevic in the Dock- At What Price?, TIME, July 9, 2001, at 32
(noting that Milosevic was surrendered the day before a donors' conference "of Western nations... to
consider the Serbs' request for $1.25 billion in reconstruction aid").
134. Id. See also Andrew Purvis, Long Walk to Justice, TIME, July 9, 2001, at 30, 31
(Following Milosevie's surrender, the Yugoslav representative was blunt. "'We did it,' he told the
donors' conference. 'Now it's your turn.' The assembled governments responded with pledges of almost
$1.3 billion in aid. Whether such a price was worth the incarceration of Milosevic is a question that only
the shades of his victims are entitled to answer.").
135. See supra text accompanying note 28.
136. See, e.g., Mark Ashurst, Now, a 'Quiet Revolution. Mobile Phones Leapfrog an Obstacle
to Development, NEwSwEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at 32 (describing boom in mobile phones, along with the
liberalization of Africa's airwaves, as a politically "potent combination"). There are still contexts in
which the media is controlled by the government and propaganda, masquerading as news, is all that is
available. Even for Milosevic, however, this became problematic. See Peter Maas, Radio Wars, BRILL'S
CONTENT, March 2001, at 108 (describing Milosevic's failure to silence a U.S.-supported radio station).
137. A cropped photo featured on the cover of TIME, May 1, 2000, for example, showed a gun
apparently aimed at Elidn Gonzdlez. In fact, as the uncropped photo showed, the gun was aimed at the
fisherman trying to prevent federal agents from returning Eli~n to his father. Michael R. Francher, Much
Debate, Discussion behind the Decision to Place TIIT Photo of the Raid, SEATTLE TiMES, April 30,
2000, at A19.
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drives the law.138 Rhetoric, especially powerful visual images, generates the
political will to link violence and the word. This may result in punishment for
those who violate human dignity, as the footage of the death camps did at
Nuremberg. 139 But it may also make such violations possible. Thus, the image
of the American soldier being dragged along the street in Somalia,140
appearing on millions of screens throughout the country, discouraged
intervention in Rwanda. 141 As in Lola, only in hindsight does any result seem
inevitable.
C. Fragmentation
According to David Harvey:
[T]he most startling fact about postmodernism [is] its total acceptance of the
ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic .... But postmodemism
responds to that fact in a very particular way. It does not try to transcend it, counteract it,
or even to define the "eternal and immutable" elements that might lie within it.
Postmodemism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of
change as if that is all there is.1
42
PIL's "total acceptance of... fragmentation" illuminates the instant context
in three specific ways.14 3 First, it focuses us on the fragmentation of the law,
138. See, e.g., Joseph Hanania, The Power of Images Paid for by Politicians, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2000, at AR 29 (noting that Adlai Stevenson "refused to appear in television advertisements, saying
they showed contempt for the American people and proclaiming, 'This isn't Ivory Soap versus
Palmolive"). Those who control the media may effectively control the "political will." Thus, a free
press is a potentially powerful antidote. Even if the press is "free," however, it must be able and willing
to enter a particular area. See, e.g., NPR Profile, supra note 104 (Ted Turner castigates Silicon Valley,
noting that CNN has gone to more than 18 states where there is virtually no other Western presence).
Even if a "free" press is in a particular area, the result is unpredictable, as shown in Somalia. See infra
note 140.
139. For a first-hand account of the viewing, and immediate impact, of the films, see TELFORD
TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 187 (1992) (concluding
that, although the viewing "contributed little to the determination of their individual guilt," it "certainly
hardened sentiment against the defendants generally").
140. Michael Elliot, The Making of a Fiasco: Somalia: An Inside Look at how Washington
Blundered Into a Misguided 'Two Track' Policy, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1993, at 34 (describing how "the
world watched a happy crowd drag the stiff, nameless corpse of an American soldier through the streets
of Mogadishu"); Bloodbath: What Went Wrong?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1993, at 32 (picture showing the
body of a U.S. serviceman dragged through the streets); Reid G. Miller, Last 1,100 U.S. Troops
Withdraw from Somalia, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 1994, at 3 (describing the completion of U.S.
military withdrawal from Somalia). For a gripping account of the failed mission in Somalia, see MARK
BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN (1999).
141. As Philip Gourevitch explains:
The desertion of Rwanda by the U.N. force... can be credited almost single-handedly to
the United States. With the memory of the Somalia debacle still very fresh... [i]t hardly
mattered that Dallaire's call for an expanded force and mandate would have not have
required American troops, or that the mission was not properly peacekeeping, but
genocide prevention.
PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED wIm
OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 150 (1998).
142. HARVEY, supra note 58, at 44.
143. More generally, international law itself can be understood as a fragment of a particular
political, historical context. Thus, just as violations of human dignity do not occur solely because of the
law, they cannot be prevented solely by law. This may be more obvious to non-lawyers than to lawyers,
whose knowledge of the law may make them prone to solipsism. Postmodern skepticism regarding the
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addressing the issue of accountability for violations of human dignity,
particularly the humanitarian/human rights law divide. Because of this
fragmentation, which is exacerbated by the multiple bodies interpreting and
applying the law, lex lata ("the law as it is") is problematic in this context.
Second, PIL's acceptance of fragmentation encourages a closer look at
lex ferenda, or "what the law should be," particularly the underlying
assumption of a universal standard. Even if there is a universal hunger for
nomos, the project of imagining it is necessarily culture-specific. The law
should be fragmented, accordingly, but coherent within a particular context.
Finally, PIL's acceptance of fragmentation highlights the fragmentation of
states themselves, in which some argue the problem is grounded. That is, the
collapse of the nation state leads to violations of human dignity because there
is no effective police authority to prevent them.
1. Lex Lata- "The Law As It Is"
a. The Fragmentation of International Law in General
As Pierre Schlag and others have pointed out, the law is already
postmodern. 144 Many of the features associated with postmodernism, "the
increasing fragmentation and heterogeneity of culture, the weakening of
traditional historical narratives, the devolution of the modernist syntheses, the
increasing speed, proliferation and succession of forms of life, the new modes
of critical practice and techniques-are all already present in the law."'145
These features are even more "present" in international law.
146
Unlike domestic law, international law remains fragmentary: there is no
Supreme Court to reconcile warring districts, 147 no legislature to fill in
doctrinal gaps. Indeed, international "law-making" is often so contentious that
no law is made at all; in many areas there are more gaps than law.1 48
modem equation of knowledge and understanding, or truth, may be particularly useful here. See Anne-
Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, The Method is the Message, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 417 (1999)
(describing common call for empirical research).
144. Schlag, supra note 73; J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MicH.
L. REV. 1966, 1973 (1992) (noting that "jurisprudence produced during the postmodem era will turn out
to display elements ofpostmodernity whether this is consciously desired or not').
145. Schlag, supra note 73, at 444. See also Diana Marie Amann, Under Deconstruction:
International Criminal Law in a Postmodern World, 3 GREEN BAG 369, 370 (2000) (arguing that the
ICTR and the ITCY, in taking the position that "people who share.., the ethnicity of their persecutors
could be victims of genocide, as long as they 'indeed constitute a stable and permanent group and were
identified as such by all,"' echoed the postmodem view that ethnicity is socially constructed). But see
Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, The Implications of Natural Law Theory for the Sociology of
Law, in POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN 126 (Anthony
Carty ed., 1990) (suggesting fundamental inconsistencies between postmodemism and human rights).
146. As Dean Farer notes, for example, "the inchoate character of the 'global community"' is a
barrier to extrapolating international criminal process from the process at the national level. Tom J.
Farer, Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal Law Help?, 22 HuM. RTs. Q. 90, 96
(2000).
147. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is based on the consent of states. Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36(2), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
148. The law on terrorism, for example, does not address the issue of non-state-sponsored
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International law is unapologetically 149 "discontinuous"; the decisions of the
International Court of Justice have no precedential value,150 and those of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)15' and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)15 2 are similarly ad hoc.'53
Treaty law applies only to the specific subject the particular treaty addresses
and is binding only on the parties to the treaty. While customary international
law ("Ci") 154 applies more broadly, states may persistently dissent from CIL
and exempt themselves from its coverage. 155 Many of the broad general
principals that comprise CIL, moreover, such as the duty to avoid harm to
neighboring states, 156 prove difficult to apply in specific cases.157
b. The Fragmentation of IHL/Human Rights Law in Particular
The law governing individual accountability for violations of human
dignity in internal wars is so fragmentary that it is incoherent. 5 ' As the
terrorism. Frederick L. Kirgis, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, ASIL
INSIGHT, Sept. 2001, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2001)
(noting that while the UN Charter did not contemplate such a situation, an argument could be made that
"article 51 [allowing use of force in self-defense] could extend to such a case if the government is
knowingly harboring the terrorists").
149. MARTii KOSKENNIEM, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989) (explaining that international law scholarship is utopian when it ignores
politics and apologist when it does not). As suggested throughout this Article, in my view international
law is far less consistent and coherent. I agree with Professor Koskenniemi, however, that it is
"ultimately doubtful whether any meaningful distinction between international law, politics and morality
can be made." Id. at 8.
150. ICJ Statute, supra note 147, art. 59.
151. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, annexed to
Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragaph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sees., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The Security Council adopted
the Secretary General's draft of the Statute without change in Resolution 827, S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
152. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
153. ICTY Statute, supra note 151, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 152, art. 2.
154. Treaty and custom are the two major sources of international law. ICJ Statute, supra note
147, art. 38. CIL has two elements: 1) state practice and 2) opinio juris, or the state's belief that such
practice is legally mandated. CIL is under attack from old civil law states like France, which are
skeptical as to its content, Louise Doswald-Beck, IHL as Customary Law, Training Seminar, supra note
17, and from old common law states like the United States, which are skeptical as to its capacity to bind.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
319 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998). CIL also evokes protest from new states that chafe
at being bound by law which they had no role in making. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000).
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1987).
156. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1907 (1941), reprinted in BARRY
CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1074 (3d ed. 1999).
157. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (concluding after
lengthy analysis that punitive damages are "essential and proper" in order to give effect to the
international prohibition against torture).
158. For a thorough and rigorous exegesis of violations of human dignity in internal wars, see
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symposium demonstrates, the sharpest legal minds in international law are
unable to agree on what the law is, let alone its meaning, impact, orapplication. 59
First, there are two distinct bodies of international law purporting to
apply here, international humanitarian law ("fL")16o and international human
rights law. Neither is particularly clear in this context. Notwithstanding lex
specialis; the general rule that the more specific law will apply, the more
specific IH is riddled with exceptions in the context of internal armed
conflict.1 61 As set out in the four Geneva Conventions, 162 for example, only
common Article 3 applies to internal armed conflicts. 163 Common Article 3
only applies, moreover, if the armed conflict occurs "in the territory of one of
the high contracting parties." In addition, it only applies to "persons taking no
active part in the hostilities," thus eliminating the prisoner of war regime
applicable in international armed conflicts.164 I1L is further muddled because
"conflict not of an international character" is nowhere defined. 165
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 72, at 95-107.
159. Slaughter & Ratner, supra note 143, at 410 passim (describing gaps and convergences).
See also RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 72, at 104 (suggesting that the principles of nullum crimen sine
lege are "perhaps clearer today" than they have ever been, but not so clear as to permit definitive
conclusions).
160. IHL "can be defined as the branch of international law limiting the use of violence in
armed conflicts by: a) sparing those who do not or no longer directly participate in hostilities; b) limiting
the violence to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict, which can be... only to weaken
the military potential of the enemy." SASs6LI & BOuvIER, supra note 93, at 67. But see Chris Jochnick
& Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 49, 50 (1994) (challenging the notion that the laws of war "humanize" war and concluding
that such law "privilege[s] military necessity at the cost of humanitarian values").
161. But see, eg., Turku Declaration, art. 3, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (1990),
(establishing minimum humanitarian standards, e.g., prohibiting "violence to the life, health and
physical or mental well-being ofpersons, in particular murder, torture, mutilation, rape, as well as cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other outrages upon personal dignity"). For a
description of "minimum humanitarian standards," explicitly grounded in "situations of internal violence
that pose the greatest threat to human dignity and freedom," see Report of the Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87 (1998).
162. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
163. For cases setting out the explicit rules of common Article 3 and of Protocol I, see
SAss6LI & BOuVIER, supra note 93, at 206. The statute for the ICTR explicitly provides for prosecution
ofpersons who have committed or ordered to be committed "serious violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions ... and of additional Protocol II." ICTR Statute, supra note 152, art. 4. See
generally LAW AND CIvIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Tom Farer,
Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife, 82 HARv. L.
Rav. 511 (1969); and RICHARD FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD (1968). For a rigorous
analysis of the role of the U.N. up through the mid-70s, see Oscar Schachter, The United Nations and
International Conflict, in LAW AND CIvIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, at 401.
164. "Those placed hors de combat by . . . detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely." ICTR Statute, supra note 152, art. 3.1. There are no "combatants"
in internal conflicts.
165. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN ANTrrsBELL 257 (1995).
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Optional Protocol II, specifically focused on non-international conflicts
(whatever they are), is further limited to conflicts among "organized armed
groups, which, under responsible command, exercise such control over part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement this Protocol. ' 166 Article 1.2, however, explicitly
exempts "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of this similar nature, as
not being armed conflicts." 167 As Theodor Meron notes, as long as there is a
state, it will characterize an armed conflict within its borders as a
"disturbance."
168
While conventional human rights law169 is not explicitly limited to
peacetime, during conflict it is subject to derogation under Article 4 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1 70 and Article 4 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.171 Specified
rights, e.g., the right to life or freedom from arbitrary detention, are
nonderogable, 172 but even these may be balanced against the humanitarian law
defense of "military necessity. '' 173 While peremptory norms, i.e., jus cogens
norms, from which no derogation is permitted,17 remain in effect, reliance on
other CIL during conflict is problematic.
175
The circumstances, if any, under which individuals may be held
accountable is similarly a matter of continuing controversy. 176 States may be
166. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol Il), of June 8, 1977, art. 1.1. See aLso
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 72, at 93-94 (explaining the process through which Protocol II was
drafted and its scope).
167. Protocol II, Article 1.2. See also RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 72, at 99 ("[D]eveloping
world states were unenthusiastic about Protocol II, suggesting again its lack of acceptance as existing
custom.').
168. Theodor Meron, Training Seminar, supra note 17. See, e.g., Judgment, The Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, International Cirminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Sept. 2,
1998, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 86, at 1187 (2000) (noting
that the Chamber "concluded that it had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that acts of the
defendant were committed in conjunction with an armed conflict").
169. This refers to the body of treaty law addressing human rights, especially the "International
Bill of Rights," which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra notes 50-51; the
Civil Covenant, supra note 51; and the Economic Covenant, supra note 51.
170. The Civil Covenant, supra note 51, art. 4.1, provides that "[i]n time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed," the State may
derogate from certain rights. Art. 4(1) prohibitions on discrimination, genocide, torture and slavery may
never be abrogated. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 100, at 325-6.
171. Economic Covenant, supra note 51, art. 4.
172. Civil Covenant, supra note 51, art. 4.2.
173. SASs6LI & BOUVIER, supra note 93, at 161-62. This highlights the fundamental paradox of
humanitarian law: there is nothing "humanitarian" about combat, no greater violation of "human
dignity" than a bullet ripping open a human body.
174. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 65.
175. As a matter of law, however, this regime has not yet been adopted. Meron, Training
Seminar, supra note 168. Meron has proposed a regime for the lacuna in which neither IHL nor human
rights law apply. For a thoughtful discussion of this gap, grounded in permissible derogation, the lack of
accountability under human rights law for non-state armed groups, and the lack of specificity of existing
human rights rules, see SASS6LI & BOUVIER, supra note 93, at 532-37.
176. "[During internal conflict, the] ICTY has found that individuals may be held responsible
for violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, for the violations of the laws and
After/word(s): 'Violations of Human Dignity'
liable under the Geneva Conventions, the human rights treaties, or CIL, and
there is some precedent for individual civil liability in connection with jus
cogens violations. 177 But individual criminal liability is a matter of domestic
law178 and the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals.179 While the Nuremberg
Tribunal established liability for crimes against humanity, it expressly limited
liability to those involving interstate aggression. Thus, Nuremberg provides
no authority for imposing liability in the context of internal armed conflict'
80
Finally, growing numbers of international 18  as well as national
tribunals 18 2 address all of these issues, and the relations among them are
unsettled. The ICTY183 and ICTh 184 interpret both bodies of law as well as
their own statutes.185 Several states have asserted universal jurisdiction over
customs of war and for crimes against humanity." O'Connell, supra note 9, at 343.
177. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding jurisdiction under
Alien Tort Claims Act in connection with torture and resultant death in Paraguay of plaintiffs' son and
brother); Kadic v. KaradEd, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding Karadzic liable for official torture
under Torture Victim Protection Act), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180
[hereinafter Women's Convention], contemplates private actors as violators, according to Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. General Recommendation No. 19, Violence
Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/47/38, at 1 (1992), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 100, at 361.
178. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) (recognizing Israel's right
to prosecute German war criminal under the universality principle). See also infra note 186.
179. JORDAN PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 27
(2000) ("The statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals were the first... to explicitly define violations of
common Article 3 committed during an insurgency as 'war crimes."'). See David Wippman, Atrocities,
Deterrents, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 473, 488 (1999) (describing
the "general deterrent effect" of international criminal prosecutions as "modest and incremental, rather
than dramatic and transformative").
180. Can criminal liability be imposed in the absence of domestic law without violating the
notice requirements, or the bar on ex post facto laws, set out in the ICCPR and generally accepted as
CIL? See Ratner & Abrams, supra note 72, at 21-22 (explaining why criminality in this context turns on
CIL). Crimes against humanity as set out in Article 7 of the ICC are subject to criminal penalties. See
HENKiN ET AL., supra note 100, at 627; War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects:
Prosecutor v. Duiko Tadi6, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1441 (1998). This is both under- and over-
inclusive; that is, it includes crimes that may not be "violations of human dignity" but it does not include
all violations of human dignity.
181. [Criminal tribunal] judges are likely to fit their approaches to the dynamics of the situation
rather than to an ill-suited text. Their rulings may have the welcome effect of extending
punishment to a greater number of atrocities-increasing both the possibility of reparation and
the potential for deterrence .... These rulings enlarge international jurisdiction. They permit
fledgling entities to exercise the repressive power of an amalgamation of states in ways never
before permitted, against the most disdained individuals.
Amann, supra note 145, at 373.
182. See infra note 186. Cf. Martha Minow, Introduction: Robert Cover and Law, Judging, and
Violence, in NARRATivW, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 1, 6 (Martha Minow
et a. eds., 1992) (describing how Cover "detailed the concurrency-and the seeming redundancy-
among judiciaries able to hear the same cases or issues. . . . Cover celebrated this redundancy.
According to Cover, the availability of multiple judicial settings offers a check against errors, a guard
against bias, a challenge to ideological blinders, and an opportunity for innovation").
183. See ICTY Statute, supra note 151, art. 3 (violations of the laws or customs of war), art. 4
(genocide), art. 5 (crimes against humanity).
184. See ICTR Statute, supra note 152 (the text of articles 3, 4, and 5 are the same as the
corresponding articles in the ICTY Statute).
185. Article 3 (Crimes Against Humanity) of both the ICTR Statute and the ICTY Statute gives
the Tribunal jurisdiction to prosecute persons responsible for "the following crimes when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic,
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jus cogens violations1 86 as well as other violations of human rights law. The
proliferating truth commissions-part tribunal, part public confessional-do
not always attempt to sort out what the law is.
187
The applicable law, in short, is relatively recent, unsettled, and shows
few signs of stabilizing. In fact, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in 1998, which will come into force in July 2002, may make
international criminal law even more ambiguous. 188 While many consider the
provisions of the ICC Statute to state existing customary law,13 9 this is
difficult to reconcile with several major states' refusal to ratify it, including
the United States, China, and Russia, 19  reflecting a lack of consensus on
central issues. The United States refuses to ratify the ICC, for example, in part
because of concerns about exposing U.S. nationals, particularly those in the
military, to criminal prosecution before tribunals hostile to the United
racial or religious grounds: murder, extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture;
rape; persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; other inhumane acts.").
186. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Spain, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom have asserted criminal jurisdiction over "enemies of all humanity." Douglass
Cassel, The ICC's New Legal Landscape: The Need to Expand U.S. Domestic Jurisdiction to Prosecute
Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 380-81 & nn.11-21
(1999). This may be problematic. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, Pinning Guilt on Pinochet, 6 ILSA J. INT'L
& Comp. L. 371, 372 (2000) (arguing that "if Spain can try Pinochet for violations of the Spanish
version of international criminal law, then Iran can try Salman Rushdie under the Iranian version of
international criminal law"); Dan Bilefsky, Human Rights Law May Give Belgium Political Headache,
WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A9 (noting that the law giving Belgium courts jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity, wherever committed, and without immunity to serving heads of state, has produced at
least one "political headache": Palestinians filed a lawsuit against Ariel Sharon). The United States is
among the countries that have opened their courts, at least with regard to civil liability. William
Glaberson, U.S. Courts Become Arbiters of Global Rights and Wrongs, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 2001, at
Al (describing the "growing use of the American legal system" to adjudicate "rights and wrongs all over
the globe"); Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga. A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies For International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE I. INT'L L. 1. See, e.g., Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding Alien Tort Claims Act affords jurisdiction for
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity). See generally Beth Van Schaack, The Civil
Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in Domestic Courts, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 295 (2000). For
an example of domestic legislation establishing universal jurisdiction for "grave breaches," see text of
the Moniteur Belge, 16 juin 1993 (Act of June 16, 1993), reprinted in Sass6li & Bouvier, supra note 93,
at 580-84.
187. See, e.g., Hayner, supra note 108 (noting distinction between "truth phase" and 'Justice
phase"); David Weissbrodt & Paul W. Fraser, Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation, 14(4) HuM. RTS. Q. 601 (1992) (comparing several past commissions). In Guatemala,
for example, the Commission was unable to subpoena witnesses or compel the production of documents.
Jan Perlin, The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission Finds Genocide, 6 ILSA J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 389, 391 n.9 (2000). See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, at 30, U.N.
Doc. HR I/GEN/1l/Rev. 1 (1994) ("Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to
investigate [acts of torture); to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure
that they do not occur in the future.").
188. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, AICONF.183/9, July 17, 1998,
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statuteromefra.htra. See David J. Scheffer, The United States
and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999). See generally Panel, The
International Criminal Court: Contemporary Perspectives and Prospects for Ratification, 16 N.Y.L.
ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 505 (2000) (discussing contemporary perspectives and prospects for ratification).
189. As Louise Doswald-Beck explains, this is supported by the negotiating history of the
Rome Statute, in which the delegates expressly note that they are attempting to crystalize customary
international law. Doswald-Beck, Training Seminar, supra note 17.
190. For a list of the parties, see The Coalition for the ICC Home Page, available at
http://www.iccnow.org (providing ongoing updates) (last visited July 30,2001).
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States1 91 If the United States agreed that the U.S. military would be subject to
such prosecution under CIL, 192 however, its opposition would be academic.
1 93
While it may be argued that the elements of a crime should be
distinguished from jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrator, the relationship
between the violation of the law and a state's willingness to punish that
violation is all too clear in this context. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson opined in
the Pinochet case:
[Before the coming into force of the Torture Convention] ... there was no international
tribunal to punish torture and no general jurisdiction to permit or require its punishment
in domestic courts. Not until there was some form of universal jurisdiction for the
punishment of the crime of torture could it really be talked about as a fully constituted
international crime.
194
This doctrinal parsing reflects (and sustains) a fatal disconnect, a gap,
between violence and the word. The law is as variable as the political will to
impose it. Lex lata, accordingly, remains fragmentary and discontinuous.
Recognizing the absence of any firm legal ground, international lawyers
answer strategically when asked, "What is the law?"'195 They hope that a few
key convictions, 196 in conjunction with the willingness of at least some
national courts to assert jurisdiction' 97 and the revelations of the truthconunissions, 198 will help some of the victims, their families, and
191. Madeleine Morris, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Over Nationals of
Non-Party States, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 363 (2000) (suggesting that there are two functions of
ICC jurisdiction, determination of individual criminal liability and determination of lawfulness of states'
acts, and urging "robust jurisdiction" for the former but a more flexible jurisdiction in connection with
the latter). See generally Michael Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party
States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 67 (2001). Some in the United
States are also concerned about charges against highly-placed government officials, or former officials.
Compare Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FO REiGN AFFARS, 86 July/Aug. 2001,
at 86 (arguing against a broad policy of universal jurisdiction), with Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual
Leaders Responsible for Violations of Customary International Law: The U.S. Bombardment of
Cambodia and Laos, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 429 (2001) (arguing that Kissinger can be held
responsible for deaths resulting from the U.S. bombardment).
192. The U.S. has quite emphatically refused to do so. But see Monroe Leigh, The United
States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. 3. INT'L L. 124, 126-27 (2001) (describing U.S. position that
U.S. military would not be subject to prosecution under CIL as "very controversial" and noting that
"remarkably--[that position] has never been backed up by citation of legal authority, or by an opinion of
the legal adviser of the Department of State, or the attorney general").
193. Postmodem rhetoric (about 'Justice" and "vengeance" and "American interests") has
effectively drowned out modernist debates about legal semantics (elements of crime, evidentiary
burdens) for the time being, at least. HASSAN, supra note 20, at 91 (pointing out that "rhetoric" is
characteristically postmodern, while "semantics" is characteristically modem). Cf. Harbury v. Deutch,
No. 96-00438, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22414 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1999) (unpublished opinion refusing to
dismiss claim against individual employees of the CIA accused of responsibility for torture and
execution in Guatemala).
194. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
[1983] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (1998), reprinted in HENKiNTrAL., supra note 100, at 661.
195. See, e.g., Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 1.
196. There is obviously a range of opinion as to the particular convictions which might be
'ey." See infra text accompanying notes 296-301.
197. See supra note 186. For detailed analyses of four recent cases establishing precedent for
prosecutions before national courts, see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 72, at 168-178 (describing
prosecutions in Argentina, Ethiopia, post-communist Germany, and Rwanda).
198. Judge Richard J. Goldstone, Foreword to MINOW, supra note 34, at xii ("Its success has
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communities come to terms with what has happened to them. Perhaps there
will be enough violence to deter some violations of human dignity, and to
leave some perpetrators with a lifelong apprehension of retribution,199
however uncertain in form.
2. Lex Ferenda-The Fragmentation of the "Law As It Should Be"
Lex Ferenda poses a very modem question: What should the law be?
The question assumes an answer, that there is some law that will effectively
prevent, deter or punish violations of human dignity.200 PIL does not preclude
the question posed by lexferenda, but it questions the modem premise,20 1 and
again insists on the contingency of any answer.
202
Even if the premise is wrong, however, the question may still be worth
asking. This is the demand of Cover's martyrs, "insist[ing] on the law to
which they are committed";203 that is, the restoration of nomos, a normative
universe. It is important to note that the project here is not the creation of
nomos, requiring the strong forces which "create the normative worlds in
which law is predominantly a system of meaning rather than an imposition of
force.,,204 Rather, we are concerned with its restoration, requiring the "weakforces" which Cover identifies with liberalism. As he explains,
The universalist virtues that we have come to identify with modem liberalism... are
essentially system-maintaining "weak" forces. They are virtues that are justified by the
need to ensure the coexistence of worlds of strong normative meaning. The systems of
strong normative life that they maintain are the products of "strong" forces: culture-
specific designs of particularist meaning.
205
Cover's weak, system-maintaining forces are similarly the virtues of
international law. They are justified, as they are in liberalism, by "the need to
ensure the coexistence of worlds of strong normative meaning.120 6 PIL
contemplates the restoration of nomos within the framework of international
law. PIL will neither support nor allow a nomos grounded in caste °7 or
succeeded by far my expectations .... over 7,000 applications for amnesty. Submissions and evidence
from over 20,000 victims. The evidence has stopped denials of the many serious human rights violations
committed by the apartheid security forces.").
199. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 72, at 277 (welcoming "the fact that national judicial
authorities are increasingly taking the position that grave human rights violations must be accounted for,
irrespective of the amount of time that may have elapsed or the standing of the individual concerned").
200. Slaughter & Ratner, supra note 143, at 415-16.
201. The law may be unable to effectively prevent, deter or punish violations of human dignity
in a particular context: "Is it meaningful even to image the healing of a nation riven by oppression, mass
killings, torture?" MNow, supra note 34, at 8. For a depiction of one creative alternative to impotent
law, see NEAL STEPHENSON, CRYPTONOMICON 401 (1999) (describing the Holocaust Education and
Avoidance Pod (HEAP)).
202. See supra Part n1.A.2, A Postmodernism ofResistance.
203. See supra text accompanying note 2.
204. Cover, supra note 28, at 12.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Civil Covenant, supra note 51, art. 2. ("Each State... undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals .. .subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as... birth or other status.").
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women's subordination,211 for example. But PIL, unlike liberalism and
modem international law, recognizes that international law also incorporates
"strong forces [or] culture-specific designs of particularist meaning."'2O9 PIL
recognizes that international law is not "neutral," but a culture unto itself.
210
International lawyers are always concerned with at least two "cultures,"
the national and the international,2n and often even more where violations of
212human dignity are alleged. From a PIL perspective, international law must
resonate within and across the borders of these cultures.2 13 Lex ferenda is
necessarily fragmented because its objective is to restore an inevitably
fragmented normative universe.214 Even if the law cannot effectively address
violations of human dignity, it may still be important to try-for a multiplicity
of reasons, reflecting the range of "culture-specific designs of particularist
meaning" whose coexistence it seeks to assure.215 Professor Minow, for
example, notes the need to avoid complicity.216 Lawrence Weschler reportsthe consensus of atrocity scholars that public "acknowledgment" is
208. See Women's Convention, supra note 177 (affirming women's equality). See also Civil
Covenant, supra note 51, art. 2; Economic Covenant, supra note 51, arts. 2, 3.
209. Cover, supra note 28, at 12.
210. The theme of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in 2001
was The Visible College of International Law, an explicit attempt to identify an epistemic community of
international lawyers that transcends national boundaries. While the co-chairs cited Oscar Schachter,
The Invisible College ofInternational Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 217 (1977), the theme could also be
understood as a reaction to the previous year's groundbreaking effort to open the meeting to new
participants.
The "strong forces" that constitute this culture surely include the norms set out in the UN Charter
and the International Bill of Rights, supra note 51. The meaning of these norms, and whether other
norms might be included, is hotly disputed. From a PIL perspective, these norms should be questioned,
like the weak forces of liberalism, when they behave like strong forces.
211. For a useful and cogent introduction to the comparative method, and the need for such a
method when multiple cultures are involved, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion,
Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COM. L. 43 (2000). See also
Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 357 ("For international law in all its stylistic variations always involves
translation from one language to another. Through it, the languages of power, desire and fear that are the
raw materials of social conflict are translated into one or another of the idiolects expounded in the
contributions to the symposium.").
212. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the national "culture" included groups sufficiently
distinct to form the five separate entities of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Macedonia. Lowl F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATONAL LAW
261 (4th ed. 2001). As Cover elegantly put it, "The imperial [world-maintaining mode] is an etude on
the theme of diversity." Cover, supra note 28, at 16.
213. "Each group must accommodate in its own normative world the objective reality of the
other." Cover, supra note 28, at 28-29 (describing the relationship between the Mennonites and the
state). See also Trimble, supra note 16, at 845 ("Rhetorical strategies must be tailored to culture and
subculture.").
214. As Cover concludes, "The interdependence of legal meanings makes it possible to say that
the Amish, the Shakers, and the judge are all engaged in the task of constitutional understanding. But
their distinct starting points, identifications, and stories make us realize that we cannot pretend to a
unitary law." Cover, supra note 28, at 33.
215. See generally Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its Limitations,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 2022, 2070 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALs: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)) (arguing that "judicial processes are a critical tool in
ending and preventing violations of international law . . . providing catharsis, honoring victims,
stigmatizing tyranny, restoring legality, 'bearing witness,' or otherwise having dignitary functions").
216. See MiNOw, supra note 34, at 49.
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psychologically crucial for most, if not all, victims.2 17 Asked why he
participated in a UN fact-finding mission to Rwanda, William Schabas
responded simply: "It seemed important to let the Rwandans know that
[Westerners] were interested in their stories. 218 Professor Schabas left it to
those who came forward to decide why it was important for them to do so.
From a PIL perspective, lex ferenda should be particularly open to
challenge from the bottom, from those who have been subordinated and claim
that the law perpetuates that subordination, but considerably more skeptical
regarding challenges from above. Recognizing that the omission of rape as a
war crime perpetuates the subordination of women, for example, is a good
reason 219 for expanding the law to include rape as a war crime.
PIL's acceptance of the fragmentation of the normative universe
multiplies such challenges. The conviction for war crimes of four Rwandans
by a Belgian court in June, 2001, for example, was both an effective exercise
of universal jurisdiction and a painful reminder of imperialism.220 The
normative universe is fragmented here into that of the Tutsi victims in 1994
and that of the larger Rwandan population (including the Hutus) throughout
its colonial history.221 Lex ferenda, accordingly, should recognize the
challenges of both subordinated groups.
From a PIL perspective, the Belgian trial both vindicated international
law by punishing the 1994 violations of human dignity, and simultaneously
recalled international law's role in colonialism, which institutionalized the
violations of human dignity in which the 1994 violations were arguably
grounded.222 Lex ferenda could address this dilemma in several different
ways. It could indicate a preference, for example, for trials before
international tribunals over trials before the courts of former colonial powers.
But there may well be cases where such courts should assume the
217. LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH
TORTURERS 3, 4-5 (2d ed. 1998), reprinted in HENKIN ETAL., supra note 100, at 632-33.
218. Observation made to Author at Lillich-Newman Human Rights Symposium, University of
Cinicinnati (Oct. 6, 1997). See also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CRIME OF CRIMES ix-xi (2000) (describing the personal origins of the "passion" that drives what he
modestly characterizes as a "rather dry and technical study").
219. As Martha Nussbaum has observed in her qualified endorsement of postmodemism,
"Getting rid of transcendent standards doesn't mean getting rid of good reasons." Martha Nussbaum,
Valuing Values: A Casefor Reasoned Commitment, YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 197,202 (1994).
220. "Critics said it set a dangerous legal precedent, and accused Belgium-the former colonial
power in Rwanda-of imperialism masquerading as justice." Bilefsky, supra note 186, at A9.
221. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 86, at 754, 1178 passim (2000).
See also Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, THE GuLAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956, at 3 (Thomas P. Whitney
trans., 1973) ("The Universe has as many different centers as there are living beings in it. Each of us is a
center of the Universe, and that Universe is shattered when they hiss at you: 'You are under arrest.").
222. Alvarez observes that the
West's complicity in the 1994 killings in Rwanda is a discomforting fact. The scale and
seriousness of that complicity take various forms. At one level, certain European powers,
namely the colonizers of Rwanda who imported their racist notions of'superior races' to
Rwanda, need to accept their responsibility for creating the 'tribalism without tribes' that
help to make genocide possible and continues to characterize Rwanda today. Much
greater blame can be attributed to those, like the French, who, in the 1990s and through
the 1994 killings themselves, continued to befriend and arm the [Hutu] government.
Alvarez, supra note 79, at 440.
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responsibility and the expense of such prosecutions precisely because of their
historical complicity. The argument that international law is an imposition of
Western will223 neither precludes application of that law nor requires the
refutation, or denial, of its characterization as another iteration of "victor's
justice., 224 Rather, the argument demands a more complex understanding of
international law. Lexferenda should incorporate that understanding, but how
it does so in a particular case may best be left open. Like Lola, international
lawyers sometimes must rely on inspiration. z5
3. The Fragmentation of States
The fragmentation of states is often viewed as the underlying cause of
the "internal conflicts" in which violations of human dignity occur with grim
regularity.226 Fragmentation of states may allow violations of human
dignity,227 or may result from them. It is unclear who "civilians" are or who
constitutes a "stable and permanent group."2 28 This is blamed not on
international law, but on international politics. The conventional story is that
the superpowers supported strong-arm regimes that were able to hold diverse
states together. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the
U.S., "the center does not hold, things fall apart," 229 from Tito's Yugoslavia to
Mobutu's Zaire.
23 0
223. For a detailed account of the ways in which human rights law suffers from Western bias,
see Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589 (1996).
224. For a court's attempt to "appraise the legality of a major belligerent policy pursued by the
victor," see Richard A. Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks Upon
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 759 (1965) (describing Japanese court's decision that the
use of atom bombs by the United States was illegal).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 27-38 (describing how Lola robs her father's bank in
the second scenario and wins the money in the third). Lola's earlier inspiration (to commit a violent act)
is clearly less auspicious than her later one (to rely on luck).
226. "Because states are no longer classified as clients of one of two rival superpowers,
decisions about whether to intervene, and what to do, depend on the unique situation rather than on
established criteria. Furthermore, various actors, now free from hegemonic bonds, may respond
unpredictably." Amann, supra note 145, at 372. See also Turku Declaration, supra note 161, art. 18
("The decrease in the number of international armed conflicts has been offset by an increase in the
number of civil wars and other situations of violence inside countries. Quantifying the scale of the
problem is difficult as there is no firm agreement on the factors to apply in deciding which are the most
serious situations. If the factor of number of deaths is used, then, according to some researchers, in 1996
there were 19 situations of internal violence in which at least 1,000 people were killed.., and which,
cumulatively.., had led to between 6.5 and 8.4 million deaths.").
227. As the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson noted, 'Where
domestic law and order has broken down, individuals may feel that they can commit even the most
atrocious crimes without fear of legal sanction." Robinson, supra note 72, at 277.
228. Amann, supra note 145. See also William A. Schabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide
Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from the International Criminal Tibunal for Rwanda, 6 ILSA J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 375 (2000) (examining the conflicting interpretations by different trial chambers of
the ICTR with respect to the categorization of groups protected by the prohibition against genocide).
229. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, THE SECOND COMING (1922). The phrase was appropriated by
the Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe for his classic about colonialism. CHIMA ACHEBE, THINGS FALL
APAR.T (1958).
230. See Mobutu's Xanadu, N.Y. TIMES MAc., Sept. 26, 1999, at 82 (describing Gbadolite, a
remote village in the Congo, an eerie wasteland which dictator Mobutu once filled with three palaces, a
high-rise luxury hotel and conference center).
20021
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27:315
From a PIL perspective, however, this is a very statist view, which is not
surprising since the nation state remains the major player in the modem story.
The particular agendas of particular nation states are complicated, 231 but none
happily relinquish sovereign prerogatives. While rumors of the demise of the
sovereign state may be premature, proliferation of political forms is clear,
from increased fragmentation on the one hand, such as the continuing
breakdown of the already fragmented former Yugoslavia, to growing numbers
of regional arrangements on the other, such as the ongoing consolidation of
authority by the European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement, and
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. The question thus
becomes whether there are legal institutions capable of ensuring the
accountability of these new political institutions. As described above, such
institutions are emerging rapidly in the international law context."' In
addition, national courts are redefining their roles, effectively functioning as
234transnational legal institutions.
Moreover, while fragmented states may be dangerous places, few are in
the same league for sheer murderousness as the Soviet Gulag.235 Violations of
human dignity may well be easier to conceal in a unified state, especially in a
state less concerned with avoiding such violations than with hiding them.236
Some of the violations of human dignity in the strong-arm regimes before the
end of the Cold War are now coming to light.237 While many warn about the
231. Fragmented states, by definition, do not have coherent "agendas" although some may be
closer to developing them than others. M. Sassoli, Protection of Civilians and Other Protected Persons in
IHL, Training Seminar, supra note 17 (Aug. 9, 2000). But "strategic partnerships"; i.e., military and
economic alliances driven by Cold War ambitions and fears, shaped the world up until ten years ago.
How does the West want to shape the world now?
232. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS 24-26
(1990) (discussing the "mythology of 'sovereignty"); GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 114, at
18 (describing the "hollowing out of state sovereignty" by transnational corporations or transnational
social movements).
233. Supra notes 183-185 (describing ad hoc tribunals).
234. Supra note 186.
235. For the numbers of prisoners in Gulag corrective labor camps and colonies, reaching a
peak of 2,561,351 in 1950, see EDwIN BACON, THE GULAG AT WAR: STALIN'S FORCED LABOUR SYSTEM
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ARCHIVES 24 (1994) (analyzing statistics released after the collapse of the Soviet
Union from the Moscow state archives). See also Solzhenitsyn, supra note 221 (providing the first
account of Stalin's prison camps smuggled to the West, for which the author was awarded the Nobel
Prize in literature); TILL MY TALE IS TOLD: WOMEN'S MEMOIRS OF THE GULAG (Simeon Vilensky ed.,
1999) (describing sixteen life stories of women arrested in the 1930s at the height of the Stalinist
purges).
236. Zimbabwe, for example, recently expelled the foreign press. Zimbabwe Tells 2 Foreign
Journalists to Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, § 1, at 13 (describing how officials ordered two
journalists to leave and said they planned to expel others). See also Rachel L. Swains, Zimbabwe Arrests
4 Over News About Police, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2001, at A4 (describing the arrest of four journalists
from the nation's only remaining independent newspaper). See generally Dave Kopel, Ripe for
Genocide, NAT'L REv., Feb. 21, 2001 (describing the deterioration of the situation in Zimbabwe).
237. The question of violations of human dignity in strong-arm regimes is being explored by
the proliferating truth commissions sponsored by successor regimes. See, e.g., Hayner, supra note 108,
at 653-55 (discussing truth commissions in Latin America). In addition, a range of regional and
international organizations have sponsored investigations. See, e.g., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE (1985); Report Prepared By
The Special Rapporteur On The Situation Of Human Rights In Chile, U.N. ESCOR, Hum Rts. Comm.,
36th Sess., U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1362 (1980); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE CRIMES
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obvious risks of rogue states with nuclear weapons,238 the United States
remains the only country that has actually attacked another state with such
weapons. 239 There is no question that fragmented states create many
problems-including some life-threatening problems -for their populations.
But it is unclear whether increased "violations of human dignity" are among
them, especially if we are only considering violations committed "under a
commander in charge" as required by Protocol II, rather than violations in
general. 24
I. WHOSE ACTIONS MATTER?
The Symposium asked, "Who are the decision makers? . . . . In other
words, whose actions matter in each method's universe?"'241 PL challenges
the assumptions in these questions by suggesting that the "decision makers"
are not necessarily the ones "whose actions matter." PL focuses not on those
at the center, but on those at the margins, at the periphery. 242 Thus, those
"whose actions matter" are not necessarily the judges and the statesmen (sic)
in the public eye, but those who are barely visible at the edges.243 This
OF THE MILTARY JUNTA IN CHILE, THE CRIMEs OF THE CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA IN THE LIGHT OF
CHILEAN LAW (1974) (describing the human rights violations of the military government in Chile).
National authorities and NGOs have also contributed to the effort. See, e.g., Greg Brosnan, Four Men
Convicted in Murder of Guatemalan Bishop, WASH. POST, June 9, 2001, at A14 (describing the
conviction of four men for the 1998 murder of the bishop who led the Truth Commission blaming the
military for most of the 200,000 deaths in Guatemala's civil war); see also Commission for Historical
Clarification, Guatemala Memory of Silence, available at http://hrdata.aaas.org/cehlreportlenglish/
toc.html (last visited July 27, 2001) (reporting on human rights violations and making recommendations
to preserve the memory of the victims and to "foster a culture of mutual respect and observance of
human rights").
238. 'For the text of the arguments as well as the advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice in the proceedings on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, see THE CASE AGAINST
THE BomB (Roger S. Clark & Madeline San eds., 1996). For the individual opinions of the judges in the
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited May 2, 2002).
239. See JOHN HERSEY, HIROSHIMA (1948); THm COMMITEE FOR THE COMPILATION OF
MATERIAL ON DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE AToMIc BOMBS IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, THE PHYSICAL,
MEDIcAL, AND SocIAL EFFECrs OF THE AToMc BOMBINGS (Eisei Ishikawa & David L. Swain trans.,
1981) (assembling a compilation of effects of the atomic bombs); Falk, supra note 224, at 759
(analyzing the decision of the district court of Tokyo in which it concluded that the United States had
violated international law by dropping atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
240. Protocol II, supra note 166.
241. Slaughter & Ratner, supra note 143, at 412.
242. Saskia Sassen, Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 7, 31 (1996) ('Because globalization is creating new operational and informal openings
for the participation of non-State actors and subjects ... women and other non-state actors can gain
more representation in international law; contribute to the making of international law; and give new
meaning to older forms of international participation ... "). See also Berman, supra note 63, at 1524
(expjaining how we can "both ... mourn legal history's horrors and ... believe in law's ever-present
emancipatory potential").
243. See, e.g., Mertus, supra note 106, at 538-41 (describing "kitchen tablers," a group of
women in "a certain small kitchen in Belgrade" in the winter of 1994, id. at 538, as "outsiders to
political power," id. at 539, who nonetheless went on to "participate in the drafting of language for the
nongovernmental and governmental statements at United Nations world conferences on population and
development, housing, or women's rights.., and at international meetings of activists, scholars and
diplomats in Geneva, Strasbourg, New York and Rome." Id. at 540.). There are, of course, others at the
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includes the victims, but it may also include powerful players who seek the
relative privacy of the margins precisely for the purpose of avoiding
accountability. 244 Those whose actions matter may also include those who are
invisible, like the filmmaker, or those whose significance only becomes clear
in hindsight.245
In Run Lola Run, a few of the people Lola runs into, peripheral to the
main story, are followed by fast montages showing their futures, which
change in each version. The irritated pedestrian, for example, is followed by a
series of photos showing her holding up a winning lottery ticket, hugging a fat
happy man, and with the same man on a boat, beaming.246 The postmodern
recognition that everyone has a story, and that every story has a narrator,
shifts the focus from the positivists' analyses of functional processes and even
the "thick" descriptions of the New Haven School, to serendipity (who has a
friend in the media2 47 or the arts?248 Whose story appeals to those in
power?) 249 and to transient players, like the "teenagers who brought Milosevic
down.
' ' 250
edge. As Professor Mertus notes, "One set of actors that remains outside the equation, however, includes
... terrorists, and other splinter factions." Id. at 544 n.21. "Terrorists" are not addressed in this Article
because they presuppose a more stable, less-threatened state than the state presumably seeking to quell
"internal armed conflict" in the symposium hypothetical.
244. See Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing
Women's Rights, in RECONCEIViNG REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNAnONAL LAW 143 (Dorinda
Dallmeyer ed., 1993). In Glover's words:
[Gorbachev's decision to withdraw forces from Eastern Europe represented] the eventual
breakthrough into world politics of something once confined to people trapped and remote from
power. It was the success, delayed by three-quarters of a century, of the attitude expressed by the
German soldier at Christmas in 1914: 'We don't want to kill you, and you don't want to kiU us,
so why shoot?'
GLOVER, supra note 64, at 232-33.
245. In the shifting spacial and social relations of globalizations, the less powerful cannot be
conceived of as passive bystanders. The rise of globalized localisms, be they the English
language, fast food, the Hollywood star system, or the new intellectual property rights, and their
specific impact upon the rival local conditions across the globe generate resistances.
GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 114, at 13.
246. In another version, we see her (less happily) holding a toddler and shouting at a social
worker in the doorway of a squalid apartment, then reaching out as the social worker leaves with the
child, then running with a baby snatched from a carriage, pursued by two angry men.
247. See Alkalaj, supra note 16, at 360 (describing the role of the media, along with NGOs, in
advancing human rights in international politics); Hanania, supra note 138, at 29 (describing Lyndon
Johnson's strategy of targeting ads at the news media, which "has been a staple of campaigns ever
since").
248. See, e.g., Robert Schneider, A Massacre, Still Fresh, Remembered, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2000, at A5 (describing Oliver Py's play Requiem for Srebrenica, about the execution in July 1995 of
7000 Bosnian Muslim men by Bosnian Serbs, which the U.N. peacekeeping force entrusted with the task
of protecting them was unable to prevent).
249. See, e.g., Douglas Waller, Senator No, TIME, May 29, 2000, at 45 (describing Senator
Jesse Helms's sympathy for Madeline Albright, after hearing her story of fleeing Czechoslovalda as a
girl).
250. See, e.g., Andrew Purvis, The Gen Y Revolution, TIME, June 26, 2000, at 40 (describing
the estimated 30,000 young Serbs who have joined the informal movement known as Otpor, Serbian for
"resistance": "[T]he group is generating as much anti-Milosevic heat as anything since the end of the
NATO campaign a year ago. Otpor has few leaders, relying instead on an informal web of student
connections... [It] has no political ambitions.., just a desire to be a catalyst.").
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Lola also reminds us that sometimes those in charge remain behind the
scenes, like the filmmaker himself, the hidden subject.2 51 As in a movie,
moreover, the idea of "accountability for violations of human dignity"
depends on an audience. A trial, or truth commission, is in fact a performance,
a very public form of "justice." Who scripts this performance and who plays
the crucial roles?252 Who are they trying to mobilize, placate, or warn?
253
A. Who's at Risk?
This ever-changing cast must begin with the actual victims (if any
survive), those whose human dignity has in fact been violated. Who are their
lawyers? Where can they seek relief, or compensation for its violation? Who
is left out, ignored by the law?254 Violations of women's human rights, such
as rape, for example, were historically neither violations of humanitarian law
nor of human rights law, because the state was not the perpetrator.255
The stories of Bosnian women and girls repeatedly raped and often
impregnated horrified feminists and women's groups. 256 They brought the
251. See Pierre . Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. Rav. 1627 (1991); see also
Nicholas Onuf, Book Review, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 630, 632 (1988) (reviewing DAVID KENNEDY,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRucnuEs (1987)) ("The message is that reading and tracing are
uncontentious activities and the author an innocent facilitator. This, of course, is the typical modem
rhetorical strategy of absenting oneself from the text. Yet Kennedy is not a modem and cannot stay
away; his ever-changing voice mimics the voices typically heard in each of his doctrinal eras."). The
filmmaker determines which characters are important, and which are expendable. Unlike world leaders,
however, Tom Tykwer, who wrote and directed Lola, never lets viewers forget that "we're watching a
movie. We, like Lola, are made of movies." Chappell, supra note 27, at 4. Cf. WAG THE DOG (New Line
Cinema 1997) (presenting a fictional account in which the government passes off fake war, produced by
a manic Dustin Hoffman, as the real thing in order to distract the public from some political
embarrassment).
252. International lawyers may be constrained by the specific legal context, e.g., a proceeding
before a tribunal, evidence given before a Truth Commission, a proceeding in domestic court, which
effectively determines their audience. Those international lawyers who formulate or implement policy,
similarly, are expected to decide upon and target the audience to whom their argument should be
addressed-whether the public, the press, foreign media, or domestic Congress. See, e.g., Slaughter &
Ratner, supra note 143, at 421 ('Koskenniemi characterizes the symposium as a competition to
determine 'who is going to be the diplomat's best helper.").
253. The question of "impact" is similarly problematic. As Professor Mertus notes, "the
success of interpretive communities is hard to gauge with any degree of precision." Mertus, supra note
106, at 543.
254. PIL is more willing than most methods to challenge existing categories of the law because
of its propensity for transgressing boundaries. See Feldman, supra note 276. But see Charlesworth,
supra note 12, at 393 (discussing ways to make international criminal law more responsive to women).
255. Id.at386.
256. See, e.g., Gayle Kirshenbaum, Women of the Year: Jadranka Cigely and Nusreta Sivac,
Ms., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 64 ("[Cigelj and Sivac,] themselves survivors of this violence, labored to present
their own stories and to gather those of more than 400 others who were detained, tortured, starved, and
raped .... Devastated physically and mentally, both women found strength in telling their stories to the
media. They helped make an award winning documentary, Calling the Ghsst. They submitted testimony
to the [ICTY].'). See also Tamar Lewin, The Balkans Rapes, N.Y. Tnvms, Jan. 15, 1993, at B16
(describing Catherine MacKinnon's work with Kareta, a Croatian women's group); MiNow, supra note
34, at 6. See generally Letter dated February 2, 1993from the Permanent Representative of Denmark to
the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, Annex I, at 2, U.N. Doe S/25240
(1993) (regarding European community investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in
the former Yugoslavia); Id., Annex II, at 12 (containing Declaration on the follow-up to the Warburton
mission adopted in Brussels on Feb. 1,1993).
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rapes to media and government attention through a variety of stratagems. 7
Michigan law professor Catherine MacKinnon, for example, called the media
and delivered moving sound bites while also suing in U.S. district court.
258
Feminist groups throughout Europe lobbied their governments and the
ICTY.259 This was a laborious, multipronged effort, raising the consciousness
of participants at multiple levels.260 The victims' stories, strategically
publicized and disseminated, resulted in provisions recognizing rape as a war
crime in the statutes of the ICTY261 and the ICC, 262 as well as the ICTR.
263
Feminists have criticized these provisions because they characterize rape
as a crime against "dignity," reflecting the notion of rape as a crime against
the honor of the woman's husband and community, rather than as a violation
of the woman's rights. 264 As Charlesworth notes, furthermore, their inclusion
may have little impact on deeply gendered social structures. 265 In fact, the
consequences for the perpetrators have been negligible.266 Nevertheless, the
stories of a group of seemingly powerless victims, far removed from the
decision makers, helped shape the law.267
257. As Glover notes, "there were at least 17 rape camps, where Bosnian women and girls were
held for weeks and repeatedly raped. A European Community investigation later estimated that 20,000
women had been sexually violated. Some of the victims were as young as three or four." GLOVER, supra
note 64, at 127. Cf Laura Flanders, Rwanda 's Living Casualties, Ms., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 27 (describing
the rapes of an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 women and girls in less than 100 days).
258. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). See also, Roy Gutman, Accountability
Closes In on War Crimes; U.S. Jury Award to Bosnian Woman Sets a Precedent, Prrrs. POST-GAzEmrr,
Aug. 13, 2000, at A18 (reporting that federal jury awarded Bosnian rape victims $745 million, which,
according to Catherine MacKinnon, establishes "that you can sue for rape as an act of genocide").
259. See Feldman, supra note 26. But see Glover, supra note 64, at 5 (quoting Selma
Hecimovid, who looked after Bosnian women who had been raped: "At the end, I get a bit tired of
constantly having to prove. We had to prove genocide, we had to prove that our women are being raped,
that our children have been killed. Every time I take a statement from these women, and you journalists
want to interview them, I imagine those people, disinterested, sitting in a nice house with a hamburger
and beer, switching channels on TV.").
260. Liberal scholars similarly "credit private political actors with shaping international norms
and mobilizing public opinion behind them through skillful symbolic action." Slaughter & Ratner, supra
note 143, at 418.
261. ICTY Statute, supra note 151, art. 5(g).
262. ICC Statute, supra note 188, art. 20(e).
263. ICTR Statute, supra note 152, art. 3(g). See, e.g., Patricia H. Davis, The Politics of
Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 INT'L LAWYER 1223 (2000); Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in
Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
97 (1999). "Prosecutors consistently failed to specifically pursue crimes of sexual violence against
women until [June 1997] when chief prosecutor Louise Arbour revised an indictment... to include
charges of sexual violence." Flanders, supra note 257, at 29.
264. George Abi-Saad, a former judge on the ICTY, has described the rape of a sixty-year-old
woman, the wife of a village elder, by Serbian troops, in front of her husband and the village. George
Abi-Saad, The Place of IHL in Contemporary International Law and the UN System, Training Seminar,
supra note 17 (Aug. 7, 2000). See The High Commissioner's Position Paper on the Establishment of a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 1 39, June 15, 1998 (suggesting that sexual assault be given its
own article under the Rome Statute).
265. Charlesworth, supra note 12, at 393, passim (noting that "international law rules ... tend
to privilege a certain set of experiences and filter out many issues that touch women's lives in
particular").
266. "Five years after the event, nearly all the rapists remain free 'as do the commanders who
exploited rape as a weapon."' MINow, supra note 34, at 6 (characterizing the effort as "incomplete if not
failed").
267. Tamara L. Tompkins, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeakable, 70
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B. Who's in Charge?
PIL is less interested in nuanced and sophisticated descriptions of legal
doctrine than in the acts of powerful players at the margins, where "human
dignity" is not discussed. The forced return of Haitian refugees to a country
where they faced almost certain persecution and death, for example, was not
considered a "violation of human dignity.''268 As an outraged international
human rights community pointed out, their return clearly violated the right of
non-return, or non-refoulement, i.e., the rights of refugees everywhere to not
be sent back to the hell they have fled.269 Yet those who made the decision to
return the Haitians were able to remain at the periphery, largely insulated from
legal repercussions.
270
Less dramatically, because there was no action comparable to the forced
return, 271 but perhaps more disturbing, because there was no violation of
international law,272 the U.S. refusal to support sending U.N. troops to
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 845 (1995). See Adrien Katherine Wing & Sylke Merchfin, Rape, Ethnicity, and
Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black America, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 8 (1993). See
also Control Council Law No. 10, adopted pursuant to the Nuremberg Charter. Control Council for
Germany, Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, art. II, reprinted in YouGINDRA KHuSHALANI, DIGNITY AND
HONOUR OF WOMEN AS BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 23 (1982) (including rape as a crime
against humanity); Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. L
INT'L L. 424, 425 (1993). See generally HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKiN, THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000).
268. Harold Koh noted the parallel to "the infamous Voyage of the Damned-the ill-fated
voyage of the St. Louis in 1939-when the U.S. rebuffed fleeing Jewish refugees who had arrived at
New York and Miami harbors, forcing many back to die in Nazi gas chambers. Harold HongJu Koh,
Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 7 (1994) (citing
GORDON THOMAS & M. MORGAN WrITS, VOYAGE OF THE DAMNED (1974)). See generally Feature: The
Haitian Centers Council Case, 35 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1994). For the events leading up to the exodus,
see ALEX DuPuY, HAITI IN THE NE WORLD ORDER (1997).
269. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to U.S. Court Decision, 32 I.L.M. 1215
(1993). See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276,
189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 103)(6). The United States became a party to the Refugee Convention when it
acceded to the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 11, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); Koh, supra note 268, at 3 (citing 1981 opinion of the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which had concluded "that our treaty obligations under Article 33
applied, even outside the United States, to Haitian refugees stopped by U.S. Coast Guard cutters on the
high seas").
270. See McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992). Indeed, the use of the
French term itself seemed to effectively preclude the sound bites on which widespread domestic outrage
seems to depend.
271. "The bystanders say, truthfully 'I did not commit any atrocities.' But at what point does
passive collaboration become ethically questionable or downright indefensible?" Susan Rubin Suleiman,
Remembering and Forgetting the Holocaust, HUMAN RIGHTS AT HARVARD, supra note 73, at 51. By
preventing Haitians from "fleeing not just to the United States, but to any of the scores of islands
between the United States and Haiti. The order thus rendered the Coast Guard agents of the brutal
Haitian dictatorship by directing them to return fleeing refugees to the hands of their persecutors." Koh,
supra note 268, at 7.
272. But see Neil A. Lewis, Did Machete-Wielding Hutus Commit Genocide or Just "Acts of
Genocide'?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, at 7 (excerpting documents disclosed a week earlier by the
National Security Archive revealing debate among high-level officials in the Clinton administration
about avoiding the word 'genocide' as "that might increase legal and political pressure to act"). Glover
argues:
There is a legal obligation to take action against genocide and the Clinton administration
was worried about this. State Department officials were instructed not to use the word
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Rwanda to prevent the ensuing genocide carried no legal liability.273 In both
cases, powerful leaders were able to avoid the charge of violating "human
dignity" by what Glover calls "a passive response."274 While the appearance
of power is often desirable, its invisibility may be even more so. Thus, some
of the major players remain behind the scenes, like film makers, directing the
action, calling the shots, but invisible and unaccountable.
C. Who Cares?
In addition to the players, i.e., those at risk and those in charge, PIL
recognizes that there is always a larger audience to be addressed. This
audience is necessarily fragmented,27 6 consisting most immediately of a judge,
jury, or tribunal, but also of politicians, their constituencies, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) 277 and, crucially, the media and media consumers, all of
whom function on national and international levels. In addition, these
'genocide' about Rwanda .... The Security Council followed the American lead and
avoided using the word 'genocide.' The upshot was humanitarian aid instead of effective
police action.
GLOVER, supra note 64, at 122.
273. LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEsT IN RWANDA'S GENOCIDE
(2000) (describing the role of the Western nations in Rwanda's genocide, drawing on interviews with
peacekeepers and previously unpublished records of private security council deliberations). As Professor
Drumbl argues, "international lawyers would do well to think hard about the alternative paradigm of
crisis prevention. This means reflecting upon proactive devices that can stop genocidal crises from
occurring or re-occurring." Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Post-Genocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis
in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1221, 1326 (2000).
274. As Glover notes, "of course, understanding is not enough to stop the horrors. But the
alternative, the passive response, helps keep them going." GLOVER, supra note 64, at 5. See also
Samantha Power, Accessory to Murder?, N.Y. TvES, Feb. 11, 2001, § 7, at 33 ("'[A]ccountability' was
a concept that the last administration rightly pursued for the perpetrators of genocide but wrongly
evaded itself.'.
275. As Jeremy Greenstock notes
The consequences of conflict affect us all: for example, in Britain, ninety percent of the heroin
on the streets of our major cities is grown in Afghanistan, under the cover of the generation-long
conflict there. Across the countries of Europe, there are now several hundred thousand citizens of
the former Yugoslavia who have fled to seek sanctuary from repeated conflicts there .... There
is also a moral dimension. People in the United States, Britain and elsewhere are increasingly
unwilling to ignore the suffering of people in other parts of the world.
Jeremy Greenstock, International Human Rights and Standards, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 398, 399
(1999).
276. See supra Part H.
277. See Report on the Review of Arrangements for Consultation with Nongovernmental
Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/49/215 (1994), at 12, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT, supra note 86, at 493-94. See, e.g., Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations
and Non-governmental Organizations, E.S.C. Res. 1996/31 (affirming consultative status provisions).
For an excellent overview, see Michael Posner, Foreword: Human Rights and Nongovernmental
Organizations on the Eve of the Next Century, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (1997) (describing the growth
of NGOs since the 1960s, and noting the pivotal role of Amnesty International). See also Afra
Afsharipour, Note, Empowering Ourselves: The Role of Women's NGOs in the Enforcement of the
Women's Convention, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 129 (1999); Diane Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in
the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society, 18 HuM. RTs. Q. 107
(1996); Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994). But see Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potenates:
Nongovernmental Organizations in the "Unregulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 957 (1996)
(discussing the lack of accountability of NGOs).
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international audiences operate within the globalized and commodified
contexts of CNN, the internet, and satellite media. These audiences are
increasingly sophisticated, skeptical as to any metanarrative, 278 alert to spin.
Law matters, 279 but the question "Who is accountable?" quickly
becomes politicized.280 Who can be blamed? Who can profit from
prosecuting?281 War crimes, of course, have always been politicized.282 This is
precisely the impression that "objective" and consistent international law is
intended to overcome.
283
This is complicated by the presence of many players with conflicting
objectives.2 84 The surviving victims or their families may seek to identify the
responsible individuals, to punish and to deter.2 85 Or they may simply seek
official, formal acknowledgment of the crimes committed against them.
286
Perpetrators may seek amnesty or forgiveness. Victims and perpetrators may
overlap. The state may seek to impose liability on individuals in order to
exonerate a people.28 7 Where there would be no state left if all violators were
imprisoned, 288  in contrast, it may instead push for "truth and
reconciliation."
2 89
278. See supra Part II.A.
279. While noting that law reform is a contested strategy among feminists and that some
"might point to the greater value of political campaigns or media coverage in reducing the oppression of
women," for example, Charlesworth nevertheless insists that "claims based on international law can
carry an emotional and moral legitimacy that can have considerable political force." CHAnrEsWoRTH,
supra note 12, at 393.
280. For a comprehensive history of how political leaders have dealt with war criminals since
1815, see GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE (2000) (arguing that despite their
dubious achievement, trying war criminals is better than vengeance). See also RATNER & ABRAMS,
supra note 72, at 147 (suggesting that "the lack of fundamental elements of due process make [certain
politicized prosecutions] poor precedents . . .
281. MuruA, supra note 53.
282. BASS, supra note 280.
283. The ICTY's intemational mandate puts it at "less risk of becoming politicized." BE.EFSKY,
supra note 186. See also Chuck Sudetic, Justice is Better than Revenge, N.Y. TIMES BK. REV., Oct. 29,
2000, at 29 ("Liberal states are unlikely to shoot war criminals, although they can be tempted by that
prospect. Rather, even when liberal decisionmakers are painfully aware of the risk of acquittal, delay
and embarrassment posed by a war crimes tribunal, domestic norms push them to apply due process
beyond their own borders.").
284. Drumbl refers to the growing academic field of comparative genocide studies, which
acknowledges that "each genocide is unique. This uniqueness manifests itself in the differences of
experiences of genocide survivors, the levels of social mobilization of aggressors, the public or secretive
nature of the aggression, and the historical context from which the violence emerged." Drumbl, supra
note 273, at 1224.
285. RicHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR
135 (2000) (urging the United States to support the International Criminal Court "to cause would-be war
criminals to reconsider their ambitions, knowing that they might otherwise be hunted for the rest of their
days and eventually be brought to justice"); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International
Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. 3. INT'L L. 7, 27 (2001) (explaining how to make
"accountability fashionable").
286. HENKIN ETAL., supra note 100, at 633.
287. GOLDSTONE, supra note 285 (explaining that by establishing individual guilt, the society
at large is exonerated).
288. Cassese, supra note 100.
289. See generally Loma McGregor, Individual Accountability in South Africa: Cultural
Optimum or Political Facade?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 32 (2001) (analyzing program for individual
accountability in South Africa).
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National authorities may well be in the best position to weigh these
alternatives, 290 inviting popular input as authorities did in South Africa.291 But
national authorities are also likely to have the most at stake.292
"Accountability" may become a mechanism for purging the opposition,
obtaining foreign aid,293 and securing their own authority. "Exoneration" may
enable a regime to assure the loyalty of powerful groups, or even to avert a294
coup.
This is further complicated, paradoxically, by the need to provide a
broader, global audience295 with an unambiguous spectacle, a moral drama. 96
Lawyers not only need to prevail on the legal merits, but need to generate, or
sustain, the political will to assure the violence that Cover explains is
necessary to enforce the law. This requires publicity and skillful handling of
the media.2 97 Drafting an indictment for Milosevic, for example, was only a
preliminary step. It is doubtful that he would have been arrested without
relentless marketing.
298
290. Jonathan Charney, Editorial Comment: International Criminal Law and the Role of
Domestic Courts, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 120, 123 (2001) (arguing that "the real and more effective success
[of the ICC] will reside in the active dockets of many domestic courts around the world, the ICC having
served first as a catalyst, and then as a monitoring and supporting institution").
291. See Azanian Peoples Organization v. The President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
(4) SALR 637 (CC) (S. Afr.), reprinted in HtNKIN ET AL., supra note 100, at 633 (describing the process
through which the new Constitution was drafted). See also Cassese, supra note 100, at 3 (examining
conditions under which participation is feasible).
292. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (arguing that authorities have a duty to
prosecute); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights
Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 449 (1990) (arguing that States have a responsibility to
prosecute certain violations).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 133-134 (describing surrender of Milosevic by Serbia
on the eve of a donor conference).
294. See supra note 101 (describing amnesty in Peru). But see Tina Rosenberg, In Chile, The
Balance Tips Toward the Victims, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 2000, at A20 (describing a "new assertiveness"
on the part of the reformist government following the arrest ofPinochet in Britain).
295. Rieff, supra note 121, at 40 (arguing that the human rights movement "must take its case
to the public, not just rely on its influence and its certainty that it does an enormous amount of good in
the world").
296. Those who hid Jews in Berlin, for example, show "that the supposed choice between
unquestioning obedience and death-defying resistance is much too crude: you could resist without
automatically risking your life. It is surprising but true that-with one exception-none of the 50 people
who helped Konrad Latte paid for it with their lives, or even by imprisonment." Schneider, supra note
109, at 53. See also Drumbl, supra note 273, at 1225 (arguing that the "key variable that should
determine policy responses to genocide is the social geography [demographic composition, dynamic
group relationships, and political culture of the collectivity that exist after the genocide has ended] of the
post-genocidal society"). Professor Minow describes six inquiries that should shape responses to
genocide. MiNow, supra note 34, at 133-35. See generally Stone, supra note 73, at 49 ("[Rlemembering
may only shift the patient from an ambivalence and moral uncertainty to hatred, which becomes a
psychological cage... this has been hard for Holocaust victims; it is hard for any victim.").
297. Harold Koh describes the breakdown of students into four litigation teams in connection
with the Haitian Council case, one of which "took care of communications, press management,
lobbying, and spin control." Koh, supra note 268, at 6 n.21.
298. See, e.g., Milosovic: The Face of Evil, supra note 80 (describing cover story in Newsweek
on The Face of Evil). The ad hoc tribunals themselves, similarly, had to be "sold." This was
accomplished through a very political combination of rhetoric, diplomacy and compromise. See, e.g.,
Matthew Kaminski, Milosevic's Strategy to Center on Politics, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A9
(describing the resultant mix in the tribunal's law "of the Anglo-American common law and continental
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Like a filmmaker, an international lawyer needs to take a pro-active
stance with respect to the question, "Who cares?" The question becomes a
question of marketing: "Who needs to care" to generate the requisite political
will299 and how can this audience be made to care?
300
IV. THE INEVITABILITY OF PIL AND ITS TRANSIENCE
The symposium's final question---"Why is [your method] a better
method than the others?"--is carefully posed in the alternative: "Why is your
method better at tackling some subject areas than others?" The co-chairs
recognize the necessary contingency of any thoughtful response. From a PIL
perspective, however, even what is "better" at tackling some subject areas
remains a contingent determination. What is "better" for whom? Even
narrowing the question to "which is better to assure accountability for
particular kinds of violations?" gives rise to at least seven plausible answers,
as set forth in the symposium.
Precisely because there are an indefinite number of plausible answers,
PIL is inevitable as long as international law is functioning within the
"cultural logic of late capitalism." 30 1 Whatever one's method of choice, at
some point its limitations, or the obvious advantages of some other method,
will induce a switch. While every method assumes a world view, PIL moves
among them like a cable subscriber with a remote control. At the same time,
however, PIL is inevitably transient, always changing form.
A. Pif "s Inevitability
While the International Legal Process school provides a rational
approach to decisionmaking, 30 2 and law and economics offers tools of
measurement,303 PIL offers ambiguity.3°4 While the New Haven school
provides a way to track consensus, 30  pIL offers marginality.30 6 While
European civil law systems).
299. One increasingly obvious response to this question is: the American public. Michael
Wines,A. World Seeking Security Is Told There's Just One Shield, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2001, § 4, at 1.
300. See Koh, supra note 268, at 14 n.50 (describing plea by actress Susan Sarandon and actor
Tim Robbins for Haitians before a worldwide television audience during the Academy Awards). See
also supra note 125 (describing Rockin'for Human Rights concert). Filmmakers rely on advertising,
stars and critical "buzz." Twykor had plenty of the last. See, e.g., Janet Maslin, In a Race With Death,
There's Only One Sure Winner, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999, at E10 (describing Run Lola Run as "hot,
fast and post-human"); Stuart Klawans, Born Cool, THE NATION, July 12, 1999, at 34 ("Lola dashes
through the film like a punked-out Road Runner, pursued not by Wile Coyote but by an accident prone
Fate, whose assaults are as reversible as the workings of Acme Products."); Chappell, supra note 27.
301. JAMESON, supra note 57. If you are taken hostage in Latin America or relocate to rural
China, it might be a different story. Then again, it might not. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, The Kidnapping
Economy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 3, 2001, at 46 (describing how kidnapping is financing Colombia's
civil war). See also PROOF OF LIFE (Warner Bros. 2001) (fictional account of ransom negotiation of a
kidnapped American executive).
302. See O'Connell, supra note 9, at 337-38.
303. See Dunoff& Trachtman, supra note 13, at 394-95 (noting, however, that the authors are
unable to "reach positive conclusions" because of the lack of actual data).
304. See supra Part I.C.1.
305. Wiessner & Willard, supra note 8, at 319.
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feminist theory offers a normative polestar,30 7 PIL offers ambivalence. 30 8
While critical theory provides tools to rigorously deconstruct international
309 310law, PIL goes to the movies. Who needs it?
Most international lawyers, sooner or later, seek alternatives to whatever
method(s) they employ. None of the methods in the symposium claims to be
timeless, eternal, or "true," and no one cares. PIL is implicit in the structure of
the symposium itself, which recognizes that no method trumps; none can
possibly exclude all the others or those still to come. As even the positivists
Simma and Paulus concede, "of course, the time when the claim of positive
science to objective knowledge remained largely unchallenged is over, and
there is no way back to yesterday's certainties behind the insights of critical
theory, be it late-or postmodem." 311 PIL is the portal to all that lies beyond
the various "modernisms" set out in the symposium.
312
Unlike the methods in the symposium, PIL explicitly situates analysis in
the spatial and historical context of globalization.311 The "spatial context of
globalization ' 314 includes not only geography (Where are these violations
occurring?315 How close to Europe? How far from any U.N. "peacekeepers?")
but technology316 (Is the violation of "human dignity" on CNN?317 Or is it
306. See supra Part M.
307. See Charlesworth, supra note 12, at 379 ("insist[ing] on the importance of gender relations
as a category of analysis").
308. See supra Part I.A.2.
309. See Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 354-56.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29 (summarizing Run Lola Run). In my human
rights class, students receive extra credit for analyzing the human rights issues in the following:
WELCOME TO SARAJEVO (Miramax Films 1998); Z (Columbia Pictures Home Entertainment 1969); GET
ON THE BUS (Columbia Pictures 1997); THE OFFICIAL STORY (Almi Pictures 1985); EL NORTE (Cinecom
International Films 1983); MEN WITH GUNS (Sony Pictures Entertainment 1998); BEFORE THE RAIN
(PolyGram 1994); LAMERiCA (New Yorker Films 1994); THE SORROW AND Tim PrrY, supra note 129.
Except for the last, these films are not documentaries. Nor are they entirely fictional. Rather, they
transgress genre boundaries in classic po-mo style. For a discussion of various examples of boundary
crossing, see my previous articles cited in supra note 26.
311. Simma & Paulus, supra note 7, at 307.
312. The "modem methods" would include Positivism, the new International Legal Process,
Law and Economics, and International Relations and International Law. Critical Legal Theory, Feminist
Jurisprudence, and the Yale School, in contrast, are sometimes "beyond" the postmodem portal. Their
inclusion in the symposium no more preempts a fuller discussion of PIL, however, than the inclusion of
the new International Legal Process, Law and Economics, or International Relations preempts the fuller
discussion of Positivism.
313. "Geography and space are only two dimensions of the total manifold of events that define
a particular situation or conflict." Wiessner & Willard, supra note 8, at 321.
314. "Yet it seems obvious to me that the most important work of perpetuating and normalizing
the astonishing distributional inequities of our current world is done by the spatial division of the
world's political cultures and economies into local and national units and by the conceptual separation
of a political public law that operates nationally from an apolitical private law which operates
internationally. We now think it obvious that poverty is a local problem, while wealthy people live more
and more globally. But spatial and conceptual issues of this type are simply off the map of the
discipline's concerns." Kennedy, supra note 20, at 479.
315. Ian Fisher, Ethnic Fencing, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 21, 2000, at 59 (describing the
crowded camps in Burundi into which the Tutsis have "herded more than 300,000 Hutus").
316. See generally Spiro, supra note 113, at 21-22 (describing the revolution in global
communications).
317. See Sharing the Wealth, supra note 104 (describing Ted Turner's ambitious coverage
when he was at the helm).
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only available through an obscure listserve? ).318 The "historical context of
globalization" refers not only to the post-Cold War triumph of "free market
democracy," but also to the transposition of Cold War conflicts to other
contexts.
319
"Modem" analyses are more constrained. They may take globalization
into account,320 but they do so hegemonically, subsuming it to their own
metanarratives. 321 The conceptual frameworks of modernity can no more
represent globalization than texts can represent the polymorphous information
streaming through the internet. PIL, in contrast, plays with the frameworks of
modernity, recognizing them as human inventions, always subject to
reinvention. This may lead to the "black hole of relativism,' 322 but it can also
lead to the transformative politics323 of critical theories324 such as feminism,
325
critical legal studies,326 critical race theory,327 and postcoloniaism.
328
318. Robert Soloman from the U.S. mission to the U.N. made a presentation on the possibility
of a cyber war attack against the United States to a group of 30 law teachers from 28 countries. At its
conclusion, a law professor from Kenya curtly observed, "While I understand the United States'
concerns, I am unable to share them because 90% of my country is without electricity." Patrick
Lumumba, Training Seminar, supra note 17.
319. Engle, Culture and Human Rights, supra note 65, at 329 ("[T]he Cold War debate over
the priority of economic and social versus civil and political rights is very much alive in the culture
debate; the debate over culture in many ways provides a new focus for old debates."). See also
GLOBALIZnqG INSTITUTIONS, supra note 114, at 15 (describing "those who seek to identify the
replacement for Cold War conflicts in the clash of civilizations, pitting the West against the 'Confucian-
Islamic connection"') (citing Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FORE IGN AFF., Summer
1993, at 22). Memories of Cold War roles similarly persist. See, e.g., Kennedy, Thinking Against the
Box, supra note 20, at 438 ("It seemed for a time that the Yale School supported American Cold War
interventionalism, while the Columbia School did not'). This does not suggest, of course, that all Cold
War contests are resolved or transposed.
320. See, eg., Simma & Paulus, supra note 7, at 316 ("As long as no alternative legal processes
that would be universally acceptable are in sight, the old ones will simply have to do. And yet, the vision
of an international law more amenable to the realization of global values remains compatible with the
regime of traditional sources."); Wiessner & Willard, supra note 8, at 333 (setting out "Alternatives and
Recommendations in the Global Common Interest).
321. See, eg., Jos6 E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's
Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183 (2000). Even when modernists critique the law, when they argue
that the law should be less raced, or less gendered, or that it should better incorporate the interests of the
subordinated, they are well within classic discourse. See, eg., Barbara Stark, Urban Despair and
Nietzche's "Eternal Return ": From the Municipal Rhetoric of Economic Justice to the International
Law of Economic Rights, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1995) (arguing from a critical race
perspective that ratification of the Economic Covenant is in the interests of African-Americans); Stark,
Turning the Wheel, supra note 26, at 178-80 (arguing from a feminist perspective that ratification of the
Economic Covenant is in the interests of U.S. women); Trimble, supra note 16, at 814 (observing that
"when Chen refines [the content of the New Haven School's eight values] they turn out to be synonyms
for Western, liberal, constitutional values").
322. See supra note 76. As noted supra note 73, some postmodernists concede that the process
of deconstructing "always do[es] stop." J.M. BaIlkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of
Deconstruction, supra note 73. This is not the same as closure. Some of us stop sooner than others
because in some contexts some of us have less choice. See, e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Theory is Not a
Luxury, in RECONCEIVING REATY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 244 (arguing that
postmodem "indeterminacy" is irrelevant to rape victims in Bosnia).
323. This includes scholars who argue that even the most well-intentioned reforms replicate the
hierarchies of privilege and subordination that infuse the deep legal structure of international law. This is
obviously not a bright line, and the boundaries are more fluid in international law than in domestic law.
See, eg., Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PoLmcs, VALUES AND FUNCrIONS (1990).
Nevertheless, such scholars are more postmodem than, for example, the new international legal process,
because they are challenging the boundaries of law itself. See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 12.
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As Professors Balkin and Schlag note, all law produced during the
postmodern era will show signs of postmodemism. 329 PIL is inevitable as a
method, a strategic choice, 330 because PIL offers the fullest access to the
methods set out in the symposium 331 and, at the same time, the fullest array of
tools with which to unpack the metanarratives of which these methods are a
part.332 Like Lola, PIL asks: Whose story is it? Who is appropriating it for
what purpose? Who will get the money at the end? Who will survive?
PL is the idiolect of our time. We need only note the fragmentation and
discontinuity of our own discourse, and our apparently happy acceptance of
that fragmentation, as evidenced by the symposium itself. Incredulity toward
metanarratives is apparent in the U.S. resistance to the ICC (and its preference
324. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 765 (1987)
(explaining common attributes of critical theories). Cf Kennedy, Thinking Against the Box, supra note
20, at 489. ("For many young scholars and students, 'critical legal studies' seemed at once pass6,
dangerous, too politicized, too much associated with a 'line' of some sort." ).
325. See Christine Chinldn, A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force, 12
Aus. Y.B. INT'L L. 279 (1992). See also Shelly Wright, Economic Rights and Social Justice: A
Feminist Analysis of Some International Human Rights Conventions, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 241
(1992). Charlesworth explains: "Feminist methods emphasize conversations and dialogue rather than the
production of a single, triumphant truth. They will not lead to neat 'legal' answers because they are
challenging the very categories of'law' and 'non-law."' Charlesworth, supra note 12, at 379.
326. See DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); KosKENNimN, supra
note 149. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 357 ("For international law in all its stylistic
variations always involves translation from one language to another. Through it, the languages of power,
desire and fear that are the raw materials of social conflict are translated into one or another of the
idiolects expounded in the contributions to the symposium.").
327. See, e.g., Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
301 (1995); Ruth E. Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 903 (1997). See also Hope Lewis, Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human
Rights of Inter/national Black Women in the United States, 76 OR. L. REV. 567 (1997); Henry J.
Richardson III, "Failed States, " Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia
and Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COvn. L.J. 1 (1996) (examining international law's
role in regards to the plight of "failed states"); Berta Esperanza Hemdndez-Trayol, Borders
(En)Gendered: Normativities, Latinas, and a Latcrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 882, 892-911 (1997)
(examining the similarities and differences between Latina/o normativities and non-Latina/o
normativities).
328. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Postcolonialism and Law?, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES, at vii
(1998-99) (introducing interdisciplinary volume "ask[ing] why the attainment of 'independent
statehood' has changed only the guise of European domination rather than its substance"). But see
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE
VANISHING PRESENT 1 (1999) (noting that "postcolonial studies ... can become an alibi').
329. Schlag, supra note 73, at 440; see Balkin, supra note 23, at 1973.
330. "[T]he underlying premise of the symposium is that the practice of a particular method is a
matter of choice ... and that it is a choice that should be as self-conscious as possible." Slaughter &
Ratner, supra note 143, at 423.
331. As Professor Kennedy notes, "most international lawyers now see themselves as
pragmatists who embrace all camps in moderation." Kennedy, supra note 20, at 397. "[W]hen
confronted with a concrete issue, no single theoretical approach or method seems adequate. A range of
feminist theories and methods are necessary to excavate the issues .... There are various layers of
practices, procedures, symbols and assumptions to uncover and different tools and techniques may be
relevant at each level." Charlesworth, supra note 12, at 381.
332. Stephen M. Feldman, Playing With the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox,
85 VA. L. REV. 151, 152 (1999) (observing that some modem scholars have "partially accepted the
postmodem insight that all substantive ends and legal processes reflect distinctive cultural values and
social positions but that they domesticate [such] postmodern insights by putting them in the lawyer's
toolbox, to be taken out and used only when needed").
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for ad hoc tribunals). It is equally apparent in the widespread criticism of that
resistance, which scoffs at the United States' invocation of its major
metanarrative, the Constitution, as disingenuous if not hypocritical.333 Even as
we dismiss Lola's plot and gimmicky premise, its focus on money and its
reliance on slick camera work, we might note the commodification of our own
discipline as we advertise 334 and produce videos.335 The American Society of
International Law has hired its own media specialist.336 Nuremberg was made
into a mini-series last summer.
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B. Pif .s Inevitable Transience
PIL is inevitably transient because, like postmodemism in general, it
"swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change
as if that is all there is." 338 There is no eternal and universal "justice" to be
meted out; there are only victims, alleged war criminals, witnesses, judges and
lawyers together trying to "project . . .an imagined future," a normative
universe,339 grounded not in some glorious abstraction, but in painstakingly
constructed, albeit flexible and contingent, norms of human dignity.
PIL precludes another Nuremberg. 340 The circumstances of Milosevic's
surrender,341 as well speculations as to his sanity,342 have already assured that
his trial in the Hague will be very different. Whatever the outcome, moreover,
no one will be hung since Europe has rejected the death penalty.343 That the
international community may "never again" experience the moral certainty of
Nuremberg is not necessarily bad.
333. John F. Murphy, The Quivering Gulliver: U.S. Views on a Permanent International
Criminal Court, 34 INT'L LAW. 45,48-51 (2000). See also supra notes 179-83.
334. Every week I receive glossy, often lengthy "reports" from law schools throughout the
country, expounding on the world-renowned scholars now appearing in their international programs.
See, e.g., GLOBALAW (N.Y.U. School of Law, New York, N.Y.), Spring 2001, at 2-3 (describing
additions to "Global Law Faculty," including Jurgen Habermas, "one of the most important moral
philosophers of the twentieth century," and Ratna Kapur, "India's leading feminist scholar and
activist").
335. Public International Law Video Course (WLT Distribution 1996) (video series on public
international law developed by Elizabeth Defeis, distributed in twenty countries, in three languages).
336. See, eg., AMERICAN SOCIEY OF INThRNATIONAL LAW, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2000)
(describing the addition of a Media Outreach program funded by a $300,000 grant from the MacArthur
Foundation).
337. Nuremberg (TNT television broadcast, July 16-17, 2000). The miniseries was based on
ROBERTPERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL (1994).
338. Harvey, supra note 58, at 44.
339. Cover, supra note 2, at 1604-05.
340. But see Cohen, supra note 4 ("Robert Kempner, who was a prosecutor at the Nuremberg
trials, called those proceedings 'the greatest history seminar ever held.' The Hague and Mr. Milosevic
are unlikely to be far behind.").
341. See supra notes 133-134.
342. Lawrence Weschler, The Defendant, THE NEw YORKER, July 16, 2001, at 27 (noting that
both of Milosevic's parents were suicides and raising the question whether Hitler, if he had been tried,
would have been found insane).
343. European Union in the U.S., EUPolicy & Action on the Death Penalty, available at http'/.
www.eunnion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/deathpenhome.htm (last visited May 10, 2002) (affirming that
the "EU is opposed to the death penalty in all cases").
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The question remains, however, whether there is enough certainty to
inspire and legitimate the violence of the law, to draw states together to
impose their collective will.344 This is the question that Lola, and all
international lawyers, must grapple with in the surreal red light between
nightmare and action,345 and it is a question inevitably answered piecemeal,
on the run, as we draw on experience and count on luck, hoping to prevent
another death.
V. CONCLUSION
What saves Lola from mere cleverness is that she is not running for
money; she is running for love, to save Manni's life, to affirm and sustain her
connection with another human being.346 Like saving Manni, the issue of
accountability for violations of human dignity is ultimately one of human
connection. The international law project is to reconnect the victims, and
sometimes even the perpetrators, to the community, and, in doing so, to
reestablish that community and a normative universe in which it can thrive.
PIL reminds us that identities of "violator" and "victim" may be
problematic, that the notion of some nomos embracing them both may be even
more so, and that in a postmodern world, all such constructions are inevitably
unstable and tentative. This does not, of course, preclude the effort.347 On the
contrary, it heightens the importance of the work, and the sense of urgency
and purposefulness of those who undertake it. Run Lola run.
344. The UN treaty barring children under eighteen from combat, for example, has been signed
by seventy-one States. The biggest problem, however, is not with States but with rebel groups. Jo
Becker of Human Rights Watch, and chair of the coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, explains how
the treaty puts pressure on rebels to do the same: "Most rebel groups are fighting to become a
government . . . . You can make an argument to them that if you're using child soldiers you're
discrediting yourself." The law matters, in short, to the extent international lawyers can make it matter.
Children of War, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Nov. 27, 2000, at 16.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (describing Lola and Manni chatting in bed in
surreal red light).
346. Cf. Cover, supra note 2, at 1605 n.10 (noting that the martyr's triumph "may be seen as a
triumph of love or of law or of both, depending upon the dominant motifs of the normative and religious
world of the martyr and her community").
347. As Lola proves, "love can do anything," sometimes. RUN LOLA RUN, supra note 3. Her
triumph, of course, "may well be partly imaginary." Cover, supra note 2, at 1604.


